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FOREWORD
In August 2008, the armed conflict between Russia
and Georgia broke out on the territory of Georgia’s
breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The Russian-planned military campaign lasted 5
days until the parties reached a preliminary ceasefire
agreement on August 12. The European Union (EU),
led by the French presidency, mediated the ceasefire.
After signing the agreement, Russia pulled most of
its troops out of uncontested Georgian territories, but
established buffer zones around Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.
On August 26, 2008, Russia recognized the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, making
them a part of what President Dmitry Medvedev
called Moscow’s “zone of privileged interests,” and
since then deploying five military bases on occupied
Georgian territory.
In their monograph, Dr. Ariel Cohen and Colonel Robert Hamilton show how Russia won the war
against Georgia by analyzing the goals of war, which
include the annexation of Abkhazia, the weakening or
toppling the Saakashvili regime, and the prevention of
NATO enlargement in the Caucasus. The war demonstrated that Russia’s military is in need of significant
reforms and it indicated which of those reforms are
currently being implemented. Finally, the war highlighted weaknesses of the NATO and EU security system as it pertains to Eastern Europe and specifically to
the countries of the former Soviet Union.

		
		
		

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Russia launched the war against Georgia in August 2008 for highly valued strategic and geopolitical
objectives, which included de facto annexation of Abkhazia, weakening or toppling the Mikheil Saakashvili regime, and preventing North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) enlargement. The Russian
politico-military elites had focused on Georgia since
the days of the presidency of Eduard Shevardnadze,
whom they blamed, together with Soviet president
Mikhail Gorbachev and Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR) Communist Party Central Committee
Secretary Alexander Yakovlev, for the dissolution of
the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe and the dismantlement of the Soviet Union itself.1
Russian post-communist security establishments
also viewed the attractive Abkhaz coast line and illicit business opportunities provided by lawless Abkhazia and South Ossetia as additional incentives for
deep involvement along the metropolitan periphery.
Russian military and covert action support of secessionist movements there starting in 1992 should be
seen along this continuum. Things only got worse after pro-American, NATO, and European Union (EU)
oriented Mikheil Saakashvili was elected president.
Since 2006, the military operation rapidly became the
matter of “when,” not if.
The war also demonstrated the weaknesses of
NATO and the EU security system, because they provided no efficient response to Russia’s forced changing of the borders and occupation of an Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) member state.
The war demonstrated fissures in Europe between
the Western powers eager to maintain good relations
vii

with Russia, and the Eastern European states which,
20 years after the collapse of the USSR, retain a political memory of the Soviet occupation. Specifically,
Germany, France, and Italy were anxious to put the
war behind them and treated it as a nuisance, whereas
the presidents of Poland, Ukraine, Estonia, and Lithuania and the Prime Minister of Latvia flew to Tbilisi
during the war, to stand shoulder to shoulder with
Saakashvili.
Despite negative assessments of the Russian military performance both in and outside the Russian Federation, its war goals were mostly achieved and will
be analyzed in this monograph. From Russia’s geopolitical perspective, the war was a success. The military
performance is more difficult to define and evaluate,
as this analysis suggests.
Implications of the 2008 Russo-Georgian war for
the United States include the following:
•	The Vladimir Putin-Dmitry Medvedev administration and the defense establishment formulated far-reaching goals when they carefully
prepared over 2 1/2 years for a combined operations-style invasion of Georgia.2 These goals
included effectively terminating Georgian sovereignty in South Ossetia and Abkhazia by solidifying control of the pro-Moscow separatist
regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thus
denying Tbilisi control over these territories in
perpetuity; expelling Georgian troops and the
remaining Georgian population from the two
secessionist enclaves; preventing Georgia from
joining NATO; sending a strong signal to other
post-Soviet states, first and foremost Ukraine,
that the pursuit of NATO membership may result in dismemberment and a military invasion.
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•	In recent years, Moscow granted the majority
of the Abkhaz and South Ossetians Russian
citizenship. This is a tool of geopolitics that
other regimes in Europe practiced in darker
eras (1930s in Sudetenland). The use of Russian
citizenship to create a “protected” population
residing in a neighboring state to undermine its
sovereignty is a slippery slope that may lead to
a redrawing of the former Soviet borders, including in the Crimea (Ukraine), and possibly
in Northern Kazakhstan.
•	Russian continental power is on the rise. Small
states of Eurasia will treat nuclear armed great
powers, such as Russia and China, with respect, especially given the limited American
response to the invasion of Georgia (and the
current administration’s emphasis on the U.S.
relationship with Moscow).
•	U.S. intelligence-gathering and analysis of the
Russian threat to and invasion of Georgia was
found lacking. So was U.S. military assistance
to Georgia, worth around $2 billion over the
last 15 years, since a Russian invasion was not
seriously considered to be a strategic threat to
the U.S.-friendly country.
•	International organizations failed to prevent
the war and to force Russia to observe the
cease-fire conditions.
Among the Russian goals were:
•	Bringing down President Saakashvili and
installing a more pro-Russian leadership in
Tbilisi.
•	Providing Russia with control over Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, including using their terri-
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tory and air space for broader defense objectives in the South Caucasus.
•	Control of the South Caucasus energy corridor
(East-West corridor). If a pro-Russian regime
were established in Georgia, it would bring the
strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and
the Baku-Erzerum (Turkey) gas pipeline under
Moscow’s control.
ENDNOTES - SUMMARY
1. Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War That Shook the World, New
York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 2010, p. viii.
2. Ariel Cohen, “Springtime Is for War?” The Heritage Foundation press commentary, originally published by TechCentralStation (TCSDaily), March 31, 2006, available from www.heritage.org/
Press/Commentary/ed033106a.cfm.
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THE RUSSIAN MILITARY AND THE
GEORGIA WAR:
LESSONS AND IMPLICATIONS
RUSSIA’S GEOPOLITICAL GOALS
Moscow formulated far-reaching goals when it
carefully prepared—over a period of at least 2 1/2
years, and possibly longer—for a land invasion of
Georgia, as Dr. Ariel Cohen warned. These goals included:
•	Expelling Georgian troops and effectively terminating Georgian sovereignty in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia prepared the ground
for independence and possible eventual annexation of these separatist territories. These goals
seem to have been successfully achieved.
•	Preventing Georgia from joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and sending a strong message to Ukraine that its insistence on NATO membership may lead to war
and/or its dismemberment. Russia succeeded
in attacking a state that, since April 2008, has
been regarded as a potential candidate for
NATO membership. The Russian assault eroded the effectiveness of the NATO umbrella in
Eastern Europe, even though Georgia is not yet
formally a member, since it became apparent
that Moscow can use force against its neighbors
with relative impunity. While it remains to be
seen whether Georgia ultimately is accepted
into NATO, some voices in Europe (especially
in Germany and Italy), saw in the war a vindication of their opposition to such membership.
Ukraine’s Victor Yushchenko administration
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stood tall in solidarity with Georgia, and has attempted to take steps to limit the movements of
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, but had little domestic
support for NATO membership. The Party of
Regions effectively sided with Russia during
the war, pointing out the disastrous results of
Mikheil Saakashvili’s NATO enlargement policy for Georgia. The Yanukovich administration,
which came to power in early 2010, legislatively
enshrined Ukraine’s neutrality, including nonmembership in NATO, and granted privileges
to the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, Ukraine,
until 2042.
Russia’s long-term strategic goals included:
•	Increasing its control of the Caucasus, especially over strategic energy pipelines. If a proRussian regime were established in Georgia, it
would have brought the strategic Baku-TbilisiCeyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum
(Turkey) gas pipeline under Moscow’s control.
By attempting to accomplish regime change in
Georgia, Moscow is also trying to gain control
of the energy and transportation corridor that
connects Central Asia and Azerbaijan with the
Black Sea and ocean routes overseas—for oil,
gas, and other commodities. In 1999, Western
companies reached an agreement with Central
Asian states to create the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline. So far, this corridor has allowed Azerbaijan and partly Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, to bypass Russian-controlled pipeline
networks and transport its oil from the Caspian
Sea basin straight through Georgia and Turkey,
without crossing Russian territory.
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The growing output of the newly independent
Central Asian states has been increasingly competing
with Russian oil. By 2018, the Caspian basin, including Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, is supposed to export
up to 4 million barrels of oil a day, as well as a significant amount of natural gas. Russia would clearly
like to restore its hegemony over hydrocarbon export
routes that would considerably diminish sovereignty
and diplomatic freedom of maneuver in these newly
independent states.
Russian control over Georgia would outflank
Azerbaijan from the West, denying the United States
basing and intelligence options there in case of a confrontation with Iran. This kind of control would also
undermine any options for pro-Western orientations
in Azerbaijan and Armenia, along with any chance
of resolving their conflict based on diplomacy and
involvement of international organizations. As Russia is strengthening its long-term military presence in
Armenia, this scenario seems to be playing out in full.
•	Recreating a sphere of influence (a “sphere of
privileged interests” in official Russian parlance) in the former Soviet Union and beyond,
if/when necessary by use of force. Here, the
intended addressees included all former Soviet republics, including the Baltic States. The
message may have backfired in the short term,
as the presidents of Poland, Ukraine, Estonia,
Latvia, and Lithuania came to Tbilisi and stood
shoulder-to-shoulder with Saakashvili. However, in the long term, a number of Central and
Eastern European states, including Ukraine,
Poland, and Lithuania, have improved their
relations with Moscow. Without Western European and U.S. support, “New Europe” alone
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cannot stand up to Moscow. “Regime change”
means bringing down President Saakashvili
and installing a more pro-Russian leadership
in Tbilisi. Russia seems to have given up on
the immediate toppling of Saakashvili, and is
likely counting on its Georgian political allies
to do the job. For a while, Russia talked about
pursuing a criminal case against Saakashvili for
genocide and war crimes in South Ossetia, to
turn him into another Slobodan Milosevic/Radovan Karadzic. This is part of psychological
operations against Georgia and its leader.
PRE-CONDITIONS FOR THE WAR
Pro-Russian Separatists Inside Georgia.
Russian relations with Georgia were the worst
among the post-Soviet states. In addition to fanning
the flames of separatism in South Ossetia since 1990,
Russia militarily supported separatists in Abkhazia
(1992-93), which is also a part of Georgian territory,
to undermine Georgia’s independence and assert Russia’s control over the strategically important South
Caucasus.
Despite claims about oppressed minority status,
the separatist South Ossetian leaders are mostly ethnic Russians, many of whom served in the Russian
Secret Police (KGB); the Russian military; or in the
Soviet communist party. Abkhazia and South Ossetia
have become Russia’s protectorates, their population
largely militarized and subsisting on smuggling operations.
This use of small, ethnically- or religiously-based
proxies is not unlike Iran’s use of Hezbollah and
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Hamas in the Levant. Tbilisi tried for years to deal
with these separatist regimes by offering a negotiated
solution, including full autonomy within Georgia.
However, the United States and the European Union
(EU) members did not pressure Moscow to agree to a
settlement. These entreaties were rejected by the separatist regimes in Sukhumi, Abkhazia, and Tskhinvali,
South Ossetia, respectively.
In recent years, Moscow granted the majority of
Abkhaz and South Ossetians Russian citizenship and
moved to establish close economic and bureaucratic
ties with the two separatist republics, effectively enacting a creeping annexation of both territories. Use of
Russian citizenship to create a “protected” population
residing in a neighboring state to undermine its sovereignty is a slippery slope that is leading to a redrawing of the former Soviet borders in Russia’s favor.
Georgian attempts to reach out to European capitals and Washington to prevent the war failed. Temur
Yakobashvili, Minister in charge of “frozen conflicts,”
was told not to use the word “war” by an EU bureaucrat on the eve of hostilities, as he was warning that
the conflict was imminent.1 On August 7, 2008, after
weeks of Russian-backed South Ossetian military
provocation, Saakashvili attacked South Ossetian targets with artillery and armor. Yet, Tbilisi was stunned
by the ferocity of the Russian response. It should not
have been, nor should the U.S. Government be surprised. The writing was on the wall, but Washington
failed to read it, despite repeated warning from allied
intelligence services and a massive presence of diplomats and military trainers on the ground.
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“Kill the Chicken to Scare the Monkey.”
Aggression against Georgia also sends a strong signal to Ukraine and to European states along Russia’s
borders. Former president and current Prime Minister
Vladimir Putin spoke in the spring of 2008 about Russia “dismembering” Ukraine, another NATO candidate, and detaching the Crimea, a peninsula that was
transferred from the Russian Federation to Ukraine in
1954 by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev, when both
were integral parts of the Soviet Union.
Today, up to 50 percent of Ukrainian citizens speak
Russian as their first language, and ethnic Russians
comprise around one-fifth of Ukraine’s population.
Yet, Ukraine’s pro-Western leaders, such as President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko, have expressed a desire to join NATO, while
the pro-Moscow Ukrainian Party of Regions opposes
such membership. NATO opponents in Ukraine were
greatly encouraged by Russia’s action against Georgia.
Beyond this, Russia demonstrated that it can sabotage
American and EU declarations about integrating the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members
into Western structures such as NATO.
Military Performance.
The Russian and Georgian performances in the
war were in many ways mirror images of each other.
Russian strategy was well-thought-out and properly
resourced, giving Russia significant advantages at
the operational level of war and allowing it to overcome shortcomings at the tactical level. The Georgian
military, by contrast, was reasonably well-trained and
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well-equipped at the small-unit level and fought well
in tactical engagements, but the reactive nature of
Georgian strategic and operational planning and the
often haphazard way in which plans were conceived
and implemented undercut the tactical advantages
the Georgians enjoyed, thus undermining their entire
effort. Indeed, Georgian officers have characterized
their operation as “spontaneously” planned, with no
reserve designated, no fire support or engineer plans
written, and the main effort commander selected only
hours before the war began. They have also decried
what they describe as significant intervention by the
civilian leadership of the country in the minutest details of planning and executing the operation.2
In general then, the higher the level of analysis, the
more effective the Russian effort appears to have been.
At the strategic level, Russia was able to execute a combined political-military strategy that isolated Georgia
from its western partners while setting the conditions
for military success. At the operational level, these advantages were parlayed into success by the early commitment of a decisive amount of forces to the theater
of operations and sufficient, if not especially elegant,
operational coordination. At the tactical level, despite
disadvantages in capabilities at the small-unit level
and use of tactics that exposed its forces to the risk
of higher casualties, the offensive-mindedness, superior numbers, and speed of Russian forces committed
to the fight overwhelmed their enemy and translated
into battlefield victory.
While the Russian armed forces had retained significant elements of their Soviet strategic, operational,
and tactical heritage, the Georgian armed forces had
jettisoned Soviet doctrine and purged the vast majority of the Soviet-era military leadership. While this
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meant there was essentially no intellectual resistance
to transformation in the Georgian military, it also
meant that there was no reservoir of military experience to draw on. Most of Georgia’s leadership in the
armed forces and the Ministry of Defense was under
40 and had matured professionally in the post-Soviet
period. So, a comparison of the Russian and Georgian
efforts suggests that—at least in this case—superior
strategic and operational planning and execution allowed Russia to overcome tactical disadvantages,
while Georgia’s tactical advantages were insufficient
to overcome the strategic and operational disadvantages it faced, due at least in part to the radical nature
of the changes made in senior leadership over the past
several years.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
The short war fought between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 had implications reaching far beyond the relatively small patch of ground, sea, and air
where it was fought. Militarily, the war highlighted
both improvements in capabilities and remaining
weaknesses on both sides, weaknesses that proved in
some cases surprisingly similar, given the radically
different training and equipping efforts undertaken
by Russia and Georgia in the years prior to the war.
In both countries, the war resulted in far-reaching
efforts at reform aimed at addressing these weaknesses. Politically, the war temporarily but seriously
undermined the stability of Georgia, exposed latent
but deep divisions within NATO on the wisdom of future enlargement, and left Russia temporarily isolated
diplomatically, both for its disproportionally violent
treatment of Georgia and for its recognition of the
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self-proclaimed independence by the Georgian secessionist provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This
monograph focuses on the military performance of the
Russian armed forces during the war; it examines the
defense reform effort that resulted; it reviews and analyzes geopolitical repercussions of the first post-Soviet
Russian war beyond its borders; and it draws political
and military implications for future NATO and U.S.
policy toward Russia and the former Soviet Union.
Forces Deployed.
Any assessment of the performance of the Russian
armed forces in the war with Georgia must begin with
a comparison of Russian and Georgian forces committed to the fight. What is clear is that the war resulted
in a military victory for Russia; what is less clear is
whether the origin of the victory lies on the strategic,
operational, or tactical level, or on some combination
of these levels. In other words, was the cause of the
Russian victory a superior strategic plan that allowed
Russia to use overwhelming force to subdue Georgia;
was it superior operational art that consistently maximized Russian firepower and maneuver capabilities
while integrating these with other military capabilities; or was it simply greater tactical skill that allowed
Russia to consistently win tactical engagements, eventually causing the defeat of the Georgian forces?
One clear fact that emerges from an examination
of the forces committed by both sides is that despite
significant geographic challenges to the introduction
of forces into the theater of combat, Russia managed
to assemble, relatively quickly, a force that possessed
a significant numerical superiority over its Georgian
foe. In South Ossetia, Russia committed the 58th
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Army, based in the Russian city of Vladikavkaz and
consisting of the 19th and 42nd Motorized Rifle Divisions; the 76th Air Assault Division, airlifted to theater
from the Russian city of Pskov in the St. Petersburg
Military District; and the 98th Airborne Division, to
include elements of the 45th Intelligence Regiment,
airlifted from their bases near Moscow. A battalion of
the 33rd Special Mountain Brigade, a newly formed
unit trained and equipped to operate in the challenging terrain of the Caucasus region, was also reportedly deployed to South Ossetia.3
Russian military transportation aviation provided
the needed support as the forces deployed and engaged in the theater. In all, Russian transport aircraft
flew more than 100 sorties to move men, equipment,
and supplies to theater before and during the war.4
Alongside Russian forces fought South Ossetian militias and volunteer forces from the Russian North Caucasus, including the Chechen East and West battalions,
dreaded and feared by Georgians due to memories of
atrocities they committed during Georgia’s civil wars
of the 1990s, when they also fought on the side of the
Abkhaz separatist forces.
In Abkhazia, where Russia opened a second front
on the third day of the war, elements of the 7th Airborne Division from Novorossisk and the 76th Air Assault Division from Pskov landed from the Black Sea
alongside naval infantry of the Black Sea Fleet, while
elements of the 20th Motorized Division from Volgograd deployed by way of a railroad line from Russia
that Russian troops had repaired earlier that year. As
in South Ossetia, in Abkhazia Russian forces were
augmented by Abkhaz military forces, which were
substantially more capable than their South Ossetian
counterparts.
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Accurate estimates of the total number of Russian
and allied forces committed in the war are elusive, but
most analysts agree on a figure in the 35,000-40,000
range. Russian military analyst Pavel Felgenhauer estimates that 12,000 Russian troops assisted by “several thousand” South Ossetian and North Caucasus
militia fought in South Ossetia, while 15,000 Russian
troops fought in Abkhazia. He gives the total number
of Russian ground forces deployed as 25,000-30,000,
augmented by several thousand militia and deploying some 1,200 armored and self-propelled artillery
vehicles, 200 fixed-wing aircraft, and 40 helicopters.5
American author and former U.S. State Department
official Ron Asmus agrees, putting the total number of
Russian forces deployed during the course of the war
at 40,000.6
The Russian air force, while underperforming by
Western standards, demonstrated decisive air superiority over its Georgian foe. For the air campaign, Russia assembled a force of some 300 combat aircraft, including the Su-24, Su-25, Su-27, and Tu-22. While one
analyst claims they flew 200 total combat sorties over
the 5 days of the war,7 it is likely that the actual figure is higher. Asmus cites a figure of 400 total sorties
against 36 targets, with 120 of those sorties flown on
the second day of the war alone.8 Whatever the exact
number of sorties flown, what is clear is that Russia
enjoyed an overwhelming advantage in aircraft of all
types, with some 14 times as many combat aircraft in
theater as Georgia.9
Moscow committed itself to making the Georgia
war a combined forces operation, ordering the Black
Sea Fleet into action for the first time since World War
II. Russian naval forces arrived in theater late on the
second day of the war in the form of Black Sea Fleet
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ships led by the cruiser Moskva and the destroyer
Smetlivy, along with troop ships and support ships.
Given that the distance between their base in Sevastopol and the Georgian Black Sea coast is 400 nautical miles, these ships must have left base immediately
upon the outbreak of the war or even before. Their
mission was twofold: to land Russian troops in Abkhazia, and to seize and destroy Georgian naval facilities and forces.
Arrayed against the Russian and allied forces were
some 12,000-15,000 Georgian troops of the Land Forces Command and the Special Forces Battalion, along
with a small number of special police forces. Initially,
Georgia committed the 3rd and 4th Infantry Brigades
of the Land Forces command to the operation, along
with a task force composed primarily of Ministry of
Defense and Ministry of the Interior Special Forces
units, which together were designated as the main
effort. When Georgia’s forces in South Ossetia found
themselves increasingly outnumbered by their enemy, the Land Forces Command committed the 2nd
Infantry Brigade to the fight as well. Georgia’s small
air force consisted of eight Su-25 attack aircraft and
around 25 helicopters, but it played no role in the war
after the first day, as the Georgian leadership decided
to ground the air force to preserve it from destruction.
Beyond an incident in which the Russian side claimed
that four Georgian patrol boats came out of the port of
Poti to attack them and were destroyed, the Georgian
Navy and Coast Guard had minimal capability and
played no role in the war.
Thus, the war between Russia and Georgia saw
some 35,000-40,000 Russian and allied forces, augmented by significant air and naval forces, confront
some 12,000-15,000 Georgian forces with little air and
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no naval capability. While it is tempting to assume that
any Russia-Georgia war would result in a significant
numerical advantage for Russia simply due to the differing sizes of their overall military forces, this view
is not necessarily accurate. First, it underestimates the
geographical challenges for Russia of rapidly inserting significant numbers of forces into South Ossetia
and Abkhazia, the former of which is separated from
Russia by the Greater Caucasus mountain range and
accessible only by the Roki Tunnel, and the latter of
which is most accessible from Russia by sea or by rail.
Second, this view minimizes the extent to which Russian preparatory actions were successful in sowing
confusion and uncertainty within the Georgian government and preventing any real deterrence of Russian escalation from Georgia’s western partners. In
short, it was Russia’s skillful use and abuse of its mandate and prerogatives as a peacekeeping force in both
Abkhazia and South Ossetia that allowed it to set the
strategic conditions for success, while preventing its
adversary from doing so. And it is to Russian strategy
that we now turn.
RUSSIAN PERFORMANCE IN THE WAR
An assessment of Russian performance in the war
with Georgia must begin with an overview of Russia’s
likely objectives for the campaign. A review of Russian
military operations in the war; Russian diplomacy before, during, and after the war; and a content analysis
of Russian statements about the war lead to the following likely campaign objectives. Primary objectives
seem to have been to end Georgia’s sovereignty over
Abkhazia and South Ossetia permanently, to cripple
the Georgian armed forces, and to end Georgia’s drive
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to join NATO. Secondary objectives likely included
weakening and possibly toppling the Saakashvili government, exerting a chilling effect on other former Soviet countries considering NATO membership, especially Ukraine, and demonstrating the capability and
resolve to end what Russia saw as Western encroachment in its “zone of privileged interests.” Finally, it is
likely that Russian objectives included an element of
revenge for the Western recognition of Kosovo’s independence, which Russia had vehemently opposed and
vowed to answer.
Strategy.
In examining the Russian strategy for the war, it
is instructive to begin with an overview of the road
to war, since the actions Russia took in the months
leading up to August 2008 say much about whether
and when Russia expected war and how it hoped to
achieve its objectives if war came. Using its military
status as the only (in Abkhazia) or the primary (in
South Ossetia) peacekeeping force and its political
status as a member of the conflict resolution bodies in
both provinces, starting in early 2008, Russia undertook a series of political and military tasks designed to
sow fear and confusion in the Georgian government,
determine whether and how the West would respond
to increasing Russian pressure on Georgia, and set
the military conditions for success in a war against
Georgia. At the same time, as Anton Lavrov wrote in
Tanki Avgusta (Tanks of August), a new, comprehensive
Russian book about the conflict, “it became clear [to
the Russian leadership] that the only means to defend
these unrecognized republics was direct military intervention of the Russian army in case of Georgia’s attempt to return separatist republics by force.”10
14

Politically, Russia identified and skillfully exploited the gap between Georgian and Western policies
with respect to the “frozen conflicts” of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. In early 2008, Russia began to ratchet
up the political and diplomatic pressure on Tbilisi. On
March 6, then-President Putin announced that Russia
was unilaterally withdrawing from the sanctions regime imposed by the CIS that prohibited the delivery
of military equipment to Abkhazia. On April 16, the
Russian government announced that it was establishing direct government-to-government contact with
the unofficial governments in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, a step that Georgia claimed amounted to de facto
recognition of those regimes.
As Russian pressure increased, Georgia repeatedly
called for internationalization and civilianization of
the peacekeeping forces in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, arguing that Russia had become a party to the
conflict and therefore was unsuited to its role as lead
nation in the peacekeeping forces. Western governments and international organizations took notice and
embarked on renewed efforts to move the peace process forward. The German government, the EU, and
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) all put forth revised peace plans or sponsored peace conferences. The German peace plan for
Abkhazia was accepted by Georgia but rejected by the
Abkhaz de facto government; Russia and the separatist governments failed to appear at an EU-sponsored
peace conference on Abkhazia and rejected an OSCE
suggestion for renewed negotiations on South Ossetia.11
This combination of political pressure and blocked
attempts to restart the process of negotiations caused
Georgia to become more insistent in its warnings that
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what was underway was a de facto Russian annexation
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In response, Georgia’s
Western partners attempted to reassure Tbilisi of their
commitment to its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, while
warning the government not to allow itself to be provoked by Russia into a war that it could not hope to
win. The Georgian response was that it had red lines
in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that—if crossed—
would require a response.12 Other former Soviet countries, especially Ukraine and the Baltic Republics,
tended to sympathize with Georgia’s plight and tried
to echo Georgian concerns to Western governments.
As early as March 2008, as least one of the intelligence
services of the Baltic Republics was warning that Russia planned a war against Georgia later that year and
that the 58th Army and the 76th Air Assault Division
would participate.13 But these warnings were not communicated often enough and at a high enough level to
attract significant Western attention.
In essence, the West and Georgia were talking
past each other, with the former taking the long view
toward Georgia’s eventual NATO membership and
cautioning it not to do anything in the short term to
damage that process, and the latter insisting that its
sovereignty and territorial integrity were being compromised and warning that it could not stand by while
Russia continued a process that amounted to annexation of Georgian territory. Apparently forgotten by
the West in its desire to at once reassure and restrain
Georgia was any meaningful attempt to deter Russia
from further destabilizing actions. By the eve of the
war, then, Russia could be relatively certain that it had
succeeded in unnerving the Georgian government to
the point that its decisionmaking processes—never
especially coherent to begin with—were significantly
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compromised, and that it had also identified a gap
between Western and Georgian policies toward the
frozen conflicts that could be exploited to good effect.
Russian military actions in this period were bold
and well-coordinated with Russian political moves. C.
W. Blandy has remarked that “traditionally the Russian military mind, as embodied in the general staff,
looks farther ahead than its Western counterpart, on
the basis that ‘foresight implies control’.”14 Working
backward from their military objectives, the Russian
armed forces began a series of military tasks that
were dual use in nature—while they could conceivably (sometimes barely conceivably) be characterized
as legitimate under Russia’s peacekeeping mandate,
they also served as preparatory tasks for an invasion
of Georgia by probing Georgian defenses, introducing
new Russian forces to theater, or repairing infrastructure required for offensive operations.
As with its political counterpart, the Russian military escalation began in Abkhazia. On April 20, a Russian aircraft intercepted and shot down a Georgian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) over Abkhazia. Despite
Russian denials, an international group of experts
pinned the blame for this incident on Russia, in part
due to the fact that the UAV was able to capture and
transmit images of its killer—a Russian fighter with
the tricolor tail flash plainly visible—just before its
demise. Later in April, Russia deployed an additional
500 troops to Abkhazia, which it was authorized to
do under the peacekeeping agreement, but this also
succeeded in raising the level of tension in Tbilisi, as
the Georgian government saw both the timing of the
deployment and the type of unit deployed—an airborne battalion—as evidence that Russia was again
raising the stakes of the confrontation. Finally, in late
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May, Russia announced that it was deploying railroad
troops to repair a key railroad line in Abkhazia. This
was a signal that the war was imminent. When Georgia protested that these troops were in fact illegal under the peacekeeping agreement, Russia responded by
characterizing their mission as humanitarian. During
the war, this railroad line was used to move Russian
troops and supplies through Abkhazia. Finally, the
Georgians claimed that their sources had observed 26
shipping containers of military equipment enter Abkhazia in the spring of 2008, including D30 howitzers,
SA11 and ZSU 23-4 air defense systems, and BM21
multiple launch rocket systems.15
It is possible that Russia expected a more robust
Georgian response to its moves in Abkhazia than it
received. Although the Georgian armed forces did deploy key military leadership and enablers (especially
aviation assets) to western Georgia to set up a command post there in April-May 2008, and it did put its
ground units on a higher state of alert, the Georgian
government was careful not to take any actions that
might give Russia a pretext for war. The George W.
Bush administration warned Tbilisi at the highest level not to provoke the Russians.16
The nature of the peacekeeping forces and the
demographic makeup of Abkhazia might also have
played a role. In Abkhazia the peacekeeping force
deployed under the auspices of the CIS was entirely
Russian, whereas in South Ossetia the peacekeeping
forces had Georgian, Russian, and South Ossetian contingents, providing troublemakers on both sides with
ample targets if they wished to precipitate a crisis.
Additionally, in Abkhazia there were only two regions where appreciable numbers of ethnic Georgians
remained—the Gali district in the far southeastern
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corner of the province and the Kodori Gorge in the
far northeastern corner. The result of this was that the
Georgian and Abkhaz populations in Abkhazia were
more separated from one another than were the Georgian and Ossete populations in South Ossetia, where
Georgian and Ossete villages were intermingled. This
intermingling of populations in South Ossetia provided permissive conditions for the descent into violence
in early-August 2008.
In any case, after escalation in Abkhazia failed to
provoke a crisis, Russian attention seemed to shift to
South Ossetia. Blandy says that as early as May 2008,
units from the Russian 58th Army began setting up
assembly areas along the length of the highway from
the army’s garrison in Vladikavkaz to the Roki Tunnel, the only road avenue of approach into South Ossetia.17 While these assembly areas could conceivably
have been related to preparations for the Russian exercise Kavkaz (Caucasus) ‘08, which began in mid-July,
the exercise itself can be seen as a preparatory task for
the invasion of Georgia. Although the official scenario
for the exercise was a counterterrorist operation, the
operational and tactical scenarios involved an intervention in a fictional neighboring country.18 Exercise
participants received a card reading, “Soldier, Know
Your Probable Enemy!” On the card were listed
key personnel and equipment data on the Georgian
Armed Forces, along with their assessed strengths
and weaknesses. This was another signal that war was
imminent.
Inside South Ossetia and in the airspace over it,
Russian and allied forces escalated the situation and
put themselves at an operational and tactical advantage if and when war came. On July 8, the same day
that U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was vis-
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iting Tbilisi, four Russian Su-24s flew over the international border and loitered over South Ossetia for some
40 minutes, eliciting a strong protest from Tbilisi. This
air incursion, which Russia acknowledged openly,
was likely meant to send a signal of Russian capability and resolve and also perhaps to test Georgian and
U.S. responses.
In fact, Russian air incursions into Georgia had
been ongoing for over a year prior to the outbreak of
war. In March 2007, Mi24 helicopters attacked Georgian government buildings in the Kodori Gorge, the
only portion of Abkhazia then under Georgian government control. Then, in August 2007, an aircraft
launched a Kh-58 missile at a Georgian air defense
radar site, but the missile missed its target and failed
to explode, providing the Georgian government with
strong evidence of Russian responsibility for the attack. In both cases, Georgia turned physical evidence
from the attack sites along with radar-tracking data
over to teams of international experts, who concluded
that only Russia could have launched the strikes. The
intent of these attacks was likely threefold—to raise
the level of military pressure on Georgia, to damage
or to destroy Georgian military and government infrastructure, and to assess Georgian capabilities to
respond.
Finally, Russia apparently infiltrated the advance
elements of the units designated to take part in the
war into South Ossetia in the days immediately prior
to the outbreak of the hostilities. For instance, multiple
reports in the Russian press (some of which were later
retracted) and from Georgian intelligence sources indicated that the advance elements of the 135th and 693rd
Motorized Rifle Regiments entered South Ossetia on
or before August 7.19 Indeed, Abkhaz President Sergei
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Bagapsh announced as much when he indicated on
Abkhaz television on August 7 that a battalion from
Russia’s North Caucasus Military district had entered
South Ossetia and stabilized the situation there.20 It is
also likely that volunteer forces—most likely elements
of the Chechen East and West battalions—from the
Russian North Caucasus entered South Ossetia prior
to the initiation of hostilities. Among multiple reports
of their presence is the statement by head of the South
Ossetian Security Council Anatoly Barankevich on the
morning of August 7 that South Ossetia had requested
assistance from the Russian province of North Ossetia,
and that armed groups from there were on their way.21
So by the late-evening hour of 11:35 p.m. of August
7, just hours away from the start of the war (usually
pegged to the Georgian artillery bombardment of targets in and around the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali), a combined and integrated Russian political
and military strategy had delivered several key successes. First, it had succeeded in degrading the quality
of Georgian political and military decisionmaking by
raising and sustaining the pressure on Georgia’s political and military leadership. Second, it had succeeded
in identifying and exploiting a gap between Georgian
and Western policies that eventually led Georgia to
conclude that it had no choice but to fight a war it had
little chance of winning, and to fight that war alone.
And finally, the policy had succeeded in changing the
military balance in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia
in ways that were favorable to itself and its allies without taking any steps that the West would conclusively
see as an initiation of hostilities.
Timing of the Hostilities Outbreak. While in hindsight
it seems obvious that Russia was determined to fight
if war came, that fact was not obvious to Georgian de-
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cisionmakers at the time. Despite the increase in tensions with Russia, the Georgian leadership expected
a repeat of previous skirmishes in South Ossetia, in
which the Georgian army would confront South Ossetian militias backed by volunteer forces from the
Russian North Caucasus and only limited artillery
and aviation support from the Russian armed forces.
Georgian Chief of the Joint Staff Brigadier General
Zaza Gogava later told a parliamentary commission
of inquiry into the war that Georgian intelligence
“was not comprehensive enough to indicate that such
a large-scale Russian military intervention was to be
expected.”22 The reasons for this failure are several—
Georgia’s poor intelligence picture, the degradation
in Georgian decisionmaking capabilities brought on
by sustained Russian pressure, the fact that low-level
violence is endemic during the July-August “shooting
season” in South Ossetia, and probably plain wishful thinking—but the consequences for the Georgian
armed forces were dire. Poor Georgian planning and
an early breakdown of Georgian command and control once the operation began compounded these effects.23
If the Georgian leadership misread the Russian determination to fight, Russian decisionmakers—having
set the strategic conditions for success in the upcoming war—seemed to have been caught off guard by
the timing of its outbreak. When war came during the
night of August 7-8, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin, largely seen as the architect of the Russian political strategy, was at the opening ceremonies of the
Beijing Olympics. On the military side, Chief of the
General Staff General Nikolai Makarov was newly
appointed, while the Chief of the Main Operations
Directorate had been dismissed and no replacement
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yet been named.24 Finally, the Russian General Staff
was in the process of moving into a new building on
August 7, meaning its ability to coordinate operations
and communicate securely were temporarily degraded.
So despite several months of escalation designed to
precipitate a crisis in Georgia, the Russian leadership
was initially off balance when the war began, but was
able to quickly adjust to the situation. Prime Minister
Putin flew from Beijing to 58th Army headquarters in
Vladikavkaz, met with key military leaders, and likely
issued final guidance on political and possibly military objectives for the campaign. Several Georgian officials have noted that Putin’s arrival in Vladikavkaz
corresponded with a significant intensification of Russian air and artillery attacks and the expansion of the
war to Abkhazia.
There is also a Georgian narrative—not entirely
unconvincing—that the Russian plan was for the war
to begin later in August, and that the Georgian move
on Tskhinvali preempted it. Whatever the case, the
outbreak of the war was precipitated by a monthslong series of Russian strategic moves that deftly set
the conditions for political and military success in the
campaign.
Operations.
Having set the conditions for success on the strategic level, Russia now had to undertake offensive operations to translate this to success on the battlefield.
The introduction of volunteer forces from the North
Caucasus Republics and the lead elements of the 135th
and 693rd Motorized Rifle Regiments into South Ossetia prior to the outbreak of the war allowed Russia
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and its South Ossetian allies to prevent Georgia from
fully achieving its objectives of securing the critical
road junctions north of Tskhinvali and blocking the
exit of the Roki Tunnel to prevent the deployment of
additional Russian forces. Georgian forces did move
through Tskhinvali and had a meeting engagement
with Russian forces, probably the advance elements
of the 135th and 693rd Regiments, north of the town.
Although the tactical outcome of this first meeting
engagement between Georgian and Russian forces
was inconclusive, the presence of Russian forces that
far south in significant strength caused the Georgian
Land Forces Command to adjust its plan. The Georgian plan originally called for the main body of friendly forces to move quickly through Tskhinvali and seize
the key road junctions and villages to the north of the
city. The engagement with Russian forces there in significant numbers forced the Georgians to commit first
one, then two, and finally all three infantry battalions
of the 4th Brigade in support of the main effort in and
north of Tskhinvali. This left a gap in the west of the
Georgian zone of operations, which was eventually
filled by the deployment of the 2nd Brigade, initially
held in reserve at its base in Senaki in western Georgia. The need for Georgia to commit the 4th Brigade
to the main effort and backfill it with the 2nd Brigade
had two adverse effects for the Georgian effort. First,
the change in mission for the 4th Brigade temporarily
left a critical road unguarded. This road leads northwest out of Tskhinvali through the towns of Dzari and
Didi Gupta to the town of Java, where Russia had upgraded its refueling facility a year earlier. Leaving it
unguarded meant that Russian forces moving south
from Java could reach the northern outskirts of Tskhinvali unmolested, and Russia took advantage of this
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Georgian error. Russian analyst Mikhail Barabanov
says that by the afternoon of August 8, the 135th,
693rd, and 503rd Motorized Rifle Regiments of the
19th Motorized Rifle Division had moved south from
Java along this road all the way to the northwestern
edge of Tskhinvali,25 where they engaged in pitched
battles with Georgian forces. The second consequence
of the commitment of the Georgian 4th Brigade to the
main effort and its backfill by the 2nd Brigade would
not be felt until days later. The commitment of the 2nd
Brigade to South Ossetia left western Georgia essentially undefended, and Russia would exploit this situation when the forces it committed in Abkhazia rolled
into western Georgia on August 11 and destroyed critical military infrastructure there, most notably the 2nd
Brigade base in the town of Senaki and the Georgian
Naval base in Poti.
The first significant Georgian defeat came in
the opening stages of the war. Georgia was unable
to secure or block the exit of the Roki Tunnel—the
only route into South Ossetia from Russia—primarily due to the fact that Georgian artillery lacked the
range and accuracy to hit the tunnel’s exit, and the
fact that Russian forces had secured the tunnel’s exit
and deployed advance forces through it prior to the
outbreak of the war. Georgia was therefore reduced
to attempting to interdict the movement of Russian
forces south through the use of air attacks (the Georgian air force did not fly after August 8) and cluster
munitions fired from BM21 rocket launchers. There
is evidence that this did slow the movement of Russian forces south temporarily by damaging the bridge
at the town of Gupta,26 but once the road and bridge
had been cleared and repaired, the inexorable movement of Russian forces through the tunnel and down
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the road to Tskhinvali resumed. Barabanov says that
by August 10, in addition to the three regiments from
the 19th Motorized Rifle Division committed earlier,
Russia had deployed the following forces to South
Ossetia: the 70th and 71st Motorized Rifle Regiments
of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division; elements of the
104th and 234th Airborne Regiments from the 76th
Air Assault Division; elements of the 45th Intelligence
Regiment; and elements of the 10th and 22nd Special
Forces Brigades, as well as significant armor, artillery
and air defense formations. By this time, Russia had
opened a second front in Abkhazia by deploying units
from the 7th Airborne and 76th Air Assault Divisions,
the 20th Motorized Rifle Division, and two battalions
of Naval Infantry from the Black Sea Fleet.27
So the strategic preparation for war allowed Russia to begin it on advantageous terms—even though
the timing of the war’s outbreak seems to have come
as a surprise to the Russian political and military
leadership—and the rapid introduction of significant
forces into the theater of operations allowed Russia to
translate strategic preparation into operational advantage. Subsequent sections of this monograph will assess Russian efforts to conduct joint operations, but it
is worth noting here some operational lessons learned
about the performance of Russian ground forces. Russian military assessments have generally concluded
that Russian ground forces were the most effective
and best-performing element of the overall Russian effort.28 However, there are two qualifiers to this assessment. First, as mentioned previously, the Russian success in setting the strategic conditions for war allowed
their ground forces to enjoy advantageous force ratios
vis-à-vis Georgian forces from very early in the war.
Second, it does not appear that all ground forces per-
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formed equally well. At least one analyst has claimed
that due to the uneven quality of the motorized rifle
units committed to the fight, Russian airborne and
Special Forces units bore the brunt of the fighting in
the war against Georgia.29
Coordination between Russian maneuver forces
and supporting artillery was generally assessed as
good, although some observers have argued that
there were relatively few direct fire engagements between large Russian and Georgian maneuver units.30
If true, this would mean that the apparent Russian
success in integrating maneuver and fire support may
be less due to Russian operational skill and more to
the fact that there were few cases in which artillery
had to be used in support of forces in contact with the
enemy. Other sources have remarked that Russian
use of massive force and coordination with irregular
forces was particularly effective.31 Having trained the
North Caucasus volunteer forces, the Russian military was aware of their strengths and weaknesses and
used them in roles that maximized the former and
minimized the latter. In summary, then, successful
preparation for war on the strategic level translated
into a significant advantage for Russian forces on the
operational level. Russia exploited this advantage by
committing a significantly greater number of forces to
the fight than Georgia was able to; by using its bettertrained units in key roles; by adequate coordination
between units, including artillery; by relying on typical Soviet doctrinal tenets of operational speed and
overwhelming concentrations of forces at key points;
and by making good use of irregular forces to complement the efforts of its conventional forces. All in all, it
was an impressive 21st century engagement against a
smaller, weaker enemy, adequate for achievement of
Moscow’s geopolitical goals.
27

Tactics.
Russian strategic and operational advantages were
such that victory in the war against Georgia did not
depend to any great degree on Russian tactical skill.
Indeed, at the tactical level, in direct fire engagements
between Russian and Georgian units of relatively
equal size, Georgian forces seem to have inflicted more
damage than they suffered. In part, this was due to
superior Georgian equipment—many Georgian tanks
and infantry fighting vehicles were equipped with
reactive armor, night vision equipment, advanced radios, and superior fire control systems installed under
contract by an Israeli defense firm, while most Russian
vehicles lacked these improvements. Georgian forces
also benefited from training administered by U.S. and
other Western countries designed to prepare them for
their deployments to Kosovo and Iraq. While generally focused on stability operations or counterinsurgency, this training taught skills relevant to conventional
engagements at the tactical level as well—skills such
as reacting to contact and using firepower to support
maneuver against the enemy.
Russian forces, in contrast, generally used Soviet
tactics, moving in column formation, fighting from the
lead elements and continuing to press forward after
making contact. They generally made no attempt to
stop, establish support by fire positions, and maneuver to the flanks of the Georgian units they encountered.32 These tactics, employed as they were against
a Western-trained force, nearly had disastrous consequences for the Russian effort when the command
group of the 58th Army, including the commander,
General Anatoly Khruliev, was almost completely
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destroyed by Georgian forces. Of the 30 vehicles in
the command group, 25 were destroyed, killing a significant number of officers and soldiers, and wounding the Army Commander.33 In another engagement,
Georgian reconnaissance units identified a convoy of
Russian armor and mechanized forces descending a
mountain road northwest of Tskhinvali on the evening of August 9. When Georgian tanks engaged this
column, the Russian vehicles appeared confused, failing to return fire and acting as if they were coming
under artillery fire.34
Despite the high risk entailed by the use of Soviet
tactics in the war against Georgia, they did provide
a number of advantages to Russian units. The first of
these was speed. Declining to deploy upon contact,
using support by fire positions, and maneuvering to
the flank of enemy units allowed Russian forces—at
the cost of higher casualties—to continue to press their
advance southward through South Ossetia and into
Georgia proper. This kept up the pressure on Georgian
forces and certainly had an advantageous psychological effect, since as noted earlier the Georgian military
did not believe Russia would fight for South Ossetia on
such a significant scale. The second advantage to the
use of Soviet tactics lies in their simplicity. For units
in which vehicles are not equipped with navigation
systems, night vision systems, advanced radios, and
advanced fire control systems, the use of tight column
formations with the lead elements fighting and the rest
of the formation pushing through contact might be the
best way to maintain unit integrity and sustain the advance. Finally, Russian maneuver tactics—especially
combined as they were with massive air and artillery
attacks against Georgian forces—seem to have had a
significant shock effect on Georgian forces, as testified
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to by the significant number of Georgian vehicles left
abandoned on the battlefield.
In general, then, the higher the level of analysis, the
more effective the Russian effort appears to have been.
At the strategic level Russia was able to execute a combined political-military strategy that isolated Georgia
from its Western partners while setting the conditions
for military success. At the operational level, these advantages were parlayed into success by the early commitment of a decisive amount of forces to the theater
of operations and sufficient, if not especially elegant,
operational coordination. At the tactical level, despite
disadvantages in capabilities at the small-unit level
and use of tactics that exposed its forces to the risk
of higher casualties, the offensive-mindedness, superior numbers, and speed of Russian forces committed
to the fight overwhelmed their enemy and translated
into battlefield victory.
Interestingly, the Russian and Georgian performances in the war were in many ways mirror images
of each other. Russian strategy was well-thought-out
and properly resourced, giving Russia significant advantages at the operational level of war and allowing
it to overcome shortcomings at the tactical level. The
Georgian military, by contrast, was reasonably welltrained and well-equipped at the small-unit level and
fought well in tactical engagements, but the reactive
nature of Georgian strategic and operational planning
and the often haphazard way in which plans were
conceived and implemented undercut the tactical advantages the Georgians enjoyed and undermined their
entire effort. Indeed, Georgian officers have characterized their operation as spontaneously planned, with
no reserve designated, no fire support or engineer
plans written, and the main-effort commander select-
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ed only hours before the war began. They have also
decried what they describe as significant intervention
by the civilian leadership of the country in the minutest details of planning and executing the operation.35
While the Russian armed forces had retained significant elements of their Soviet strategic, operational,
and tactical heritage, the Georgian armed forces had
jettisoned Soviet doctrine and purged the vast majority of the Soviet-era military leadership. While this
meant there was essentially no intellectual resistance
to transformation in the Georgian military, it also
meant that there was no reservoir of military experience to draw on. Most of Georgia’s leadership in the
armed forces and the Ministry of Defense were under
40 and had matured professionally in the post-Soviet
period. A comparison of the Russian and Georgian efforts thus suggests that—at least in this case—superior strategic and operational planning and execution
allowed Russia to overcome tactical disadvantages,
while Georgia’s tactical advantages were insufficient
to overcome the strategic and operational disadvantages it suffered, due at least in part to the radical nature of the changes made in senior leadership over the
past several years.
Personnel.
Assessments of the effectiveness of the Russian
personnel system in the war have highlighted two key
deficiencies. The first of these is the lack of adequate
numbers of professional soldiers (kontraktniky), a deficiency that forced Russian commanders to deploy
conscripts despite an official policy banning their use
in wars.36 Russian news media reports indicated that
only 70 percent of the soldiers who fought in the war
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against Georgia were kontraktniky, the rest were conscripts.37 Aside from the fact that the use of conscripts
in war violates Russian Ministry of Defense policy—a
fact that is of limited relevance to Western analysis—
the problem with the deployment of conscripts is their
generally low level of training for war. In a war against
a more substantial foe this deficiency might have extremely negative effects on Russian performance.
A second problem with the personnel system exposed by the war was the failure of the system of cadre units within the Russian military. Chief of the General Staff Makarov told journalists in December 2008
that “less than 20% of our units are battle-ready, while
the rest have only officers without privates.”38 While
the existence of these cadre units has long been a fact
within the Russian armed forces—their purpose being to allow Russia to rapidly expand its armed forces
in case of major war—their existence and their role in
the war against Georgia point to a structural problem
for the Russian military. First, the fact that personnel
from cadre units had to be deployed in the war highlights the fact that even Russia’s first-line units are not
prepared to go to war “as is,” without outside augmentation. Second, when the Russian military leadership called on the staffs of these cadre units to serve
in Georgia, they were apparently shocked by how
incompetent many of them were. Makarov says, “We
were forced to handpick colonels and generals from
all over Russia”39 to replace the ineffective commanders of cadre units. Both of these problems—the role
of conscripts and the status of cadre units—are significant areas of emphasis in Russia’s current military
reform effort.
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Equipment and Weapons Systems.
We have seen that in many cases Georgian forces
were better equipped than their Russian counterparts.
Margarete Klein estimated that some 80 percent of
Russian weaponry had not been refurbished since
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.40 The effects
of this are felt in reduced capability as well as maintenance problems, both of which were in evidence
among Russian equipment in the war. It has also been
noted that Georgian tanks and infantry fighting vehicles were generally better equipped than were their
Russian counterparts, but this comparison held for
other equipment as well. Most Georgian Su-25s had
been upgraded by the same Israeli firm that upgraded
Georgia’s tanks; the result was that Georgian aircraft
tended to have superior communication, avionics, and
weapon-control systems than did Russian aircraft.
Even on the individual soldier level, the comparison
held, as Georgian soldiers were equipped with advanced helmets and body armor that Russian soldiers
lacked. There are a number of reports of Russian soldiers stripping the helmets and body armor from dead
Georgians in order to improve their personal protection. Russian forces apparently failed to use even the
protective equipment they had. At least one analyst
writes that Russian tanks and infantry carriers were
subject to destruction by Georgian rocket-propelled
grenades (RPGs) because they failed to fill their reactive armor canisters before they deployed.41 By contrast, a senior Georgian official claims that RPGs were
ineffective against Georgian armored vehicles, which
deployed with their reactive armor canisters filled.42
In addition to reduced combat capability, the failure to upgrade or refurbish Russian equipment since
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the end of the Soviet Union made it felt in the significant maintenance problems experienced by Russian
forces. There are reports of scores of broken Russian
vehicles lining the road to South Ossetia, impeding
the movement of follow-on forces.43 This fact, combined with the flow of civilians fleeing the fighting,
jammed the single road into South Ossetia and hampered the movement of Russian equipment into the
area of operations.44 Indeed, the Russian maintenance
problem was evident even to the Georgians, with a senior Georgian official claiming that over the course of
the war, 60-70 percent of Russian tanks and armored
vehicles broke down.45
Russian equipment deficiencies were not limited
to the maneuver forces. Russian military officers,
and both Russian and foreign analysts, have noted
the lack of counterbattery radars, lack of access to
satellite imagery for intelligence planning, lack of
electronic warfare capability, and a shortage of unmanned aerial vehicles as well as the poor quality of
those available as factors that significantly degraded
the Russian effort.46 The lack of reliable UAVs and
satellite imagery is what apparently led the Russian
air force to send a Tu-22 bomber deep into Georgia
on a reconnaissance and targeting mission, where it
was shot down by Georgian air defenses.47 Within the
air force, two related deficiencies stand out. The first
is the fact that GLONASS, the Russian answer to the
U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS), had not been
completed in time for the war. This, combined with
the fact that GPS data for Georgia were interrupted
during the war, made the use of GPS or GLONASS
guided precision munitions impossible. The second
problem was the overall lack of precision-guided munitions (PGMs), meaning that even munitions with
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other guidance systems (laser, for example) were not
available in sufficient numbers. These deficiencies led
to a significant degradation of the Russian air force’s
ability to identify and engage important targets, the
details of which will be discussed later.
JOINT OPERATIONS: AN ASSESSMENT OF
OPERATIONAL COORDINATION
The war against Georgia represents possibly the
first case in which Russian ground, air, and naval
components fought together in significant numbers
since the end of World War II. Most analyses of the
performance of these components give the ground
component passing marks but note several deficiencies, give the naval component high marks but admit
that it faced no serious opposition, and reserve their
harshest criticism for the air component. As far as the
coordination among them is concerned, most analyses describe it as coordination in timing of operations
only; in other words, Russian operations were coincident in time but can be characterized as joint on only
the most superficial level.48 There did not appear to
be unity of command in the joint sense, either. For instance, the commander of the North Caucasus Military District, the nominal overall commander, is said
to have had no control over the air force aircraft operating in his theater. Instead, air force operations were
personally directed by Commander of the Air Force
Colonel-General Aleksander Zelin, who controlled his
forces via mobile phone from his office in Moscow.49
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Ground Forces.
Russian armored and mechanized forces in our
discussion of Russian operations and tactics have already been assessed. To reiterate, Russian maneuver
forces were hampered by serious maintenance issues
that combined with the existence of a single axis of advance to hamper the deployment of follow-on forces.
Despite this, Russia’s introduction into South Ossetia
of advance guard forces and North Caucasus volunteer forces prior to the start of the war meant that Russia and its allies enjoyed a numerical advantage almost
from the start of combat operations, and this advantage grew as follow-on forces pushed past broken vehicles and fleeing civilians into South Ossetia once the
war began. Russian maneuver was unimaginative and
caused higher casualties than necessary, but served to
keep pressure on Georgian forces and had the advantage of simplicity. Coordination between Russian maneuver forces and artillery was generally assessed as
good.50 Additionally, the war with Georgia represents
the first use of the Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile
system, which was universally praised for its accuracy
and effectiveness.51
Russian air assault and airborne forces are assessed to have fought well. However, they were generally used in a standard infantry role rather than being inserted in key areas of the battlefield via airborne
or air assault operations. Among the airborne forces,
the 76th Air Assault Division has been singled out for
praise by Russian observers.52 There are two possible
reasons that these forces were used in a standard infantry role. The first is lack of confidence among the
Russian military leadership in the capabilities of the
conventional motorized rifle units deployed to Geor-
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gia; the second is the fact that the Russian air force
was resistant to using helicopters for air assault operations because it was focused on the fixed-wing air
campaign and because it considered the air defense
threat too high.53 If the latter is the case, this speaks not
only to a lack of joint coordination between the army
and the air force but also to a lack of an overall joint
commander.
Air Forces.
Both Russian and foreign analysts have criticized
the performance of the Russian air force in the war
against Georgia. The war exposed significant weaknesses in several key capabilities—especially suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), reconnaissance
and targeting, and strategic attack. In addition, Russian aircraft lacked the ability to operate at night, had
very little electronic-warfare capability, and made
sparing use of precision-guided missiles (PGMs).54
Carolina Vendel and Frederik Westerlund state that
the Russian air component demonstrated a “remarkably limited capacity to wage air combat for a country
aspiring to be a military great power.”55
Russian tactical aviation assets in their close air
support (CAS) role were also criticized for providing
little to no support to Russian ground forces in contact
with the enemy.56 Poor coordination between Russian
ground and air forces certainly played a role in this;
Vendel and Westerlund say that the lack of interoperable radios between army and air force units and the
lack of forward air controllers severely limited the extent to which the air force could support ground units
in contact.57 It is also likely that the Georgian air defense threat, which proved much more robust than ex-
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pected, contributed to this deficiency. Russian air interdiction (AI) appeared to have been more effective,
with multiple Georgian officials, chief among them
the Chief of the Joint Staff Gogava, having indicated
that a significant portion of Georgian combat losses in
and around Tskhinvali came from Russian aircraft.58
The Russian strategic attack plan executed by longrange aircraft suffered from a lack of good intelligence
on potential targets, a higher than expected Georgian
air defense threat, and a lack of PGMs. The result was
a poorly planned and executed strategic attack effort
that bombed military infrastructure of no importance
while neglecting important military infrastructure and
resulted in high levels of collateral damage (for which
the Russian high command may have not cared). For
instance, Russian aircraft bombed the airfields at Vaziani near Tbilisi and Kopitnari, west of Kutaisi, neither of which has been used for military flights since
the collapse of the Soviet Union. While bombing these
unimportant targets, Russian aircraft completely neglected to attack the new Georgian military bases at
Gori and Khoni, both of which were of considerable
importance. The base at Gori was eventually damaged, but only after Russian ground forces rolled into
it and began to dismantle and destroy military infrastructure and capture idle military vehicles.
This poor targeting effort is almost inexplicable
when one considers that the Georgian government
had been eager to show off its new bases and had taken several groups of foreign military and diplomatic
personnel to them after they opened. Furthermore, the
new base in Gori sits astride the main Georgian eastwest highway, meaning it would have been visible to
Russian Embassy personnel as they traveled within
Georgia in the course of their normal duties. Given
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the poor intelligence picture, what appears to have
happened is that instead of constructing a coherent
and comprehensive targeting plan for the war against
Georgia, the leadership of the Russian air force relied
on old Soviet maps and data to determine which military targets to attack. There are even indications that
the pilot of the Tu-22 shot down by Georgian air defenses was transferred from an academic assignment
to a combat flying assignment upon the outbreak of
the war because he had been stationed in Georgia during the Soviet period and knew where Georgian airfields were located.59
There were also several instances in which Russian aircraft attacked civilian targets, such as apartment buildings, schools, and hospitals. Since these
have no military value as targets and since attacking
them resulted in significant public relations problems
for the Russian military, it is highly unlikely that they
were deliberately attacked. A more likely scenario is
that the lack of PGMs, the high air defense threat, and
the poor intelligence picture constructed by Russian
targeters caused pilots either to accidentally attack
civilian infrastructure that had been misidentified as
military, or to release their bombs at the wrong time or
place due to an understandable reluctance to fly low
and slow enough to attack the proper target with the
dumb bombs available to them.
As implied above, the most significant failure in the
Russian air campaign was in the SEAD. The generally
accepted figure for Russian aircraft losses is 7-8, with
one of these having been a case of fratricide.60 At least
part of the blame for the poor SEAD effort must be
laid at the feet of the Russian intelligence community.
The Russian air force was unaware that Georgia had
purchased the BUK M1 (SA11) anti-aircraft missile
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system from Ukraine prior to the outbreak of the war,
even though Georgia had publicly reported this purchase. This system accounted for a significant portion
of the Russian aircraft losses during the war.61 Russia
also appeared to have been unaware that Georgia had
purchased the Rafael Spyder anti-aircraft system from
Israel, although this was also public knowledge.
However, even had the Russian military leadership known the true extent of Georgia’s air defense
capability, this might not have prevented the loss
of Russian aircraft. Tor Bukvoll claims that Russia
made no use of anti-radiation missiles during the air
campaign against Georgia. This is likely attributable
to two factors. The first is that Georgian air defense
units generally kept their radars off until they knew
they had Russian aircraft in range, at which time they
turned their radars on only long enough to acquire the
target and fire at it.62 The second reason is that Russia
may have had little confidence in the capabilities of
its anti-radiation missiles to destroy Georgian radars,
given the failure of the Russian Kh-58 anti-radiation
missile in the August 2007 attack on the Georgian radar near the town of Tsitelubani. In summary, a poor
intelligence effort, effective Georgian tactics, and lack
of reliable equipment crippled the Russian SEAD effort, and this had deleterious effects for the entire Russian air campaign.
The only air force assets that avoided significant
criticism of their performance in the war were transport aviation, both fixed-wing and rotary-wing. As
mentioned previously, fixed-wing transport aircraft
flew more than 100 sorties to bring soldiers and equipment to theater before and immediately after the outbreak of the war.63 Units from as far away as Moscow
and St. Petersburg were airlifted to the theater on
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short notice, although all of them, including airborne
units, were landed at friendly airfields instead of making combat jumps.64 Once in theater, airborne and air
assault units fought in a standard infantry role. Their
use in an airmobile or air assault role was restricted by
the air defense threat and the fact that the Russian air
force controlled the transport helicopter fleet and was
unwilling to use it in support of ground operations.
This has led some of the Russian army leadership to
argue that some or all of the transport helicopter fleet
should be transferred to the army.65
Naval Forces.
Little has been written on the role and performance of the Russian navy in the war with Georgia.
As mentioned in the introduction to this monograph,
the Russian naval force was built around the cruiser,
Moskva, and the destroyer, Smetlivy, and included
two battalions of naval infantry, which landed on the
coast of Abkhazia and from there moved into Georgia proper. Three landing ships appear to have been
used in the amphibious operation: the Caesar Kunikov,
Jamal, and Saratov.66 Although the landing was successful, this tells us little about Russian amphibious
capability, since it was unopposed. Subsequent Russian statements in justification of Russia’s planned
purchase of Mistral-class amphibious landing ships
from France have made reference to the fact that the
Russian landing in Abkhazia could have been completed much more quickly and effectively with Mistral-class ships.
There is little that can be learned in the way of
Russian surface-warfare capabilities from the war.
Although Russia claimed that its naval vessels Mirazh
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and Suzdalets sank a Georgian patrol boat that threatened the Black Sea Fleet as it approached the coast of
Abkhazia, Georgia does not acknowledge the loss of
a patrol boat and makes no mention of any naval action against the Black Sea Fleet in its official timeline
of the war.67 Russian forces did eventually destroy
several Georgian navy ships at anchor in Poti where
they were based, after the two sides declared a ceasefire. The Georgian coast guard, which had received
significant U.S. training and equipment and was thus
in many ways more capable than the navy, relocated
from Poti south to the port of Batumi in order to preserve its vessels.
Special Forces and Irregular Forces.
There has been little analysis of the role of Russian special forces in the war. Georgian reports mention several instances in which Russian helicopters
inserted troops in black uniforms behind Georgian
lines, where they may have engaged in subversion
and espionage.68 There are a number of reports in the
Russian media that Russian special forces (GRU) units
operated in Georgian territory. The veracity of these
reports is unknown. What is known is that North Caucasus volunteer forces—especially the Chechen “East”
and “West” Battalions—as well as South Ossetian and
Abkhazian militia forces, played significant roles in
the war. All of the irregular forces, both those from
Russia and those from the separatist provinces, were
deployed prior to the outbreak of the war and likely
conducted reconnaissance and advance-guard operations for their Russian allies.
In South Ossetia, Georgian officers contend that
militia forces deployed in Tskhinvali continually ha-
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rassed Georgian forces as they moved through the
town.69 Foreign analysts agree that these forces appear
to have engaged in standard partisan operations—using small hit-and-run engagements where their chances of survival were higher and using civilian clothing
to blend in with the local population.70 South Ossetian
militia forces and the Chechen battalions also conducted some of the most egregious ethnic cleansing
in the wake of the war, burning ethnic Georgian villages in South Ossetia and ejecting their inhabitants.
The EU, the United Nations (UN), and several human
rights organizations documented this ethnic cleansing and criticized the Russian military for its inability
or unwillingness to control forces it had trained and
which were fighting alongside it.
Abkhazian military forces were significantly better
organized and equipped than were those from South
Ossetia. The Abkhazian ground forces were organized
into three motorized rifle brigades and a separate artillery regiment, and were equipped with Russian-made
tanks, armored personnel carriers, howitzers, and
rocket launchers of various types. The total personnel
strength of the Abkhazian armed forces—including
the small air and naval forces—was around 10,000. Although Georgian forces did not move into Abkhazia as
they did in South Ossetia, there was a small Georgian
force in the Kodori Gorge (Upper Abkhazia). Abkhaz
military with Russian artillery and air support were
able to dislodge this force and seize the gorge.
Logistical Support and Strategic Mobility.
While the strategic mobility system generally performed as advertised, as is evidenced by the landings
of troops in Abkhazia by the Black Sea Fleet and the
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100-plus transport sorties that were flown to ferry
troops to the theater of operations in South Ossetia,
Russian forces proved less proficient in operational
and tactical logistics. Despite the short duration of the
war and the relatively small area over which it was
fought, there are indications that the Russian ground
logistics system was severely taxed.
The former Georgian Deputy Defense Minister
remarked that the Georgian side was aware of serious Russian problems keeping up with the demand
for food, fuel, and ammunition. Some Georgian officials believe that one of the reasons the Russian army
halted its advance at the town of Igoeti, some 30 kilometers from the capital of Tbilisi, was its logistical incapability of advancing further.71 First-hand Russian
accounts support this picture of a logistics system unable to cope with the demands placed on it. A Russian
tank commander explained the destruction of two of
his tanks in the village of Zemo-Nikozi thus: “We simply ran out of ammunition, and they surrounded us
with grenade launchers.”72
Cyber Warfare and Information Operations.
The area of cyber warfare and information operations is one of the most illuminating areas of study in
this conflict. The war against Georgia marks the first
time in its history that Russia has used cyber war and
information operations in support of its conventional
operations. The Russian cyber campaign attacked a
total of 38 Georgian and Western websites upon the
outbreak of the war, including those of the Georgian
President, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Bank, the Parliament, the Supreme Court, and the
U.S. and United Kingdom (UK) embassies in Georgia.
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These attacks appear to have been centrally directed
and coordinated, judging from the fact that they started and ended within 30 minutes of one another—beginning at about 5:15 p.m. on August 8 and ending
at about 12:45 p.m. on August 11, at the time when
Russia announced its ceasefire.73
Despite this fact, it is unlikely that the attacks were
conducted directly by the Russian government. Although Russia has been a source of many of the most
sophisticated cyber attacks in recent years, most of
these are thought to originate from a shadowy group
called the Russian Business Network (RBN), which
has not been definitively shown to have links to the
Russian government. Indeed, the fact that the RBN
is not a registered company and that its internet domains are registered to anonymous addresses makes
pinning down the origins and ownership of the RBN a
challenge for the intelligence community. In any case,
the RBN is notorious for cybercrimes such as identity
theft, phishing, spam, and malware distribution, but
it has also specialized, among other bad deeds, in the
type of distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks
that were aimed at Georgian websites during the war.74
In an earlier spat between Russia and Estonia over the
removal of a Soviet war memorial from the Estonian
capital, the Estonian government was subjected to a
similar series of attacks also thought to have been conducted by the RBN. The most likely scenario in both
cases is that RBN conducted the attacks on behalf of
the Russian government, providing the government
with plausible deniability.
Interestingly, the cyber attacks on Georgia were
less effective than they might have been against a
more wired government. Although the Georgian internet infrastructure proved relatively simple for Rus-
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sian cyber warriors to overwhelm, the Georgian government proved adept at getting itself back up online.
The Georgian President’s website was reestablished
as a page on the website of the President of Poland,
which Russia proved unable or unwilling to attack;
other Georgian government websites quickly reestablished themselves as blogs behind the protection of
google.com, and again Russia was unwilling or unable
to bring them down. The result was an explosion in
the size and importance of the Georgian blogosphere,
which has continued to be a thorn in Russia’s side
since the end of the war.75 A final reason that Russian
cyber attacks were limited in their effectiveness is that
in August 2008 Georgia had only recently set up official email accounts for its government and military.
At the start of the war, many, if not most, Georgian officials still used their personal accounts (gmail, yahoo,
etc.) for official communication, meaning that attacks
on Georgian government email servers had little effect
on their ability to communicate.
Concurrent with the cyber war against Georgia was
a Russian attempt to seize the initiative in the information war by ensuring that its narrative dominated
the discussion of the causes and results of the conflict.
The Russian narrative consistently emphasized three
major themes: first, Georgia in general and President
Saakashvili in particular were the aggressors; second,
Russia was forced to intervene in defense of its citizens and to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe; and
finally, the United States and the West had no basis on
which to criticize Russia because of Western actions in
Kosovo and elsewhere.76 Vendel and Westerlund echo
these themes, writing that a key part of the Russian
strategy was to appear to be the victim and not the
initiator of the war, which is consistent with Soviet/
Russian narratives in Afghanistan and Chechnya.77
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Key elements of this narrative took hold, especially
the idea that Russian actions were defensive in nature
and that Georgia was the aggressor. Even after extensive evidence came to light from multiple sources that
Russian forces had entered South Ossetia prior to the
outbreak of war, the idea that Georgia moved first and
Russia responded persisted. Perhaps the clearest evidence of this mindset appears in the official EU report
on the conflict. While acknowledging that there is ample evidence that Russian forces entered South Ossetia
prior to the Georgian intervention, the report surprisingly argues that there was not enough information
about the number and activities of Russian forces to
conclude definitively that an invasion was underway.
This should lead to a conclusion that intelligence
available to the EU was of a poor quality. However,
the EU report concludes that Georgia’s deployment
into South Ossetia was illegal under international law.
In addition to having a narrative prepared and
effectively propagating it in the early days of the
war, Russia seems to have been significantly savvier
in dealing with the media than it had been in previous conflicts, especially those in Chechnya. Russian
General Staff briefers appeared to have studied U.S.
briefings from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and
attempted to model their performances on these. The
Russian government also demonstrated an increased
willingness to work with the Russian media, as evidenced by the fact that it flew some 50 reporters to
Tskhinvali several days prior to the outbreak of the
war—another indication that the Russian attack was
imminent.78 It also effectively used Russian television
to portray Georgia as a Western surrogate by showing
U.S. equipment from the recently concluded exercise
Immediate Response ‘08 as “proof” that American
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forces had assisted the Georgians in planning and executing their intervention in South Ossetia.79 Russian
interactions with Western media were less frequent,
and Russian officials repeatedly complained that
Georgian officials—especially President Saakashvili—
were given too much air time on Western networks.
So the preplanned and relentlessly propagated
Russian narrative of Georgian aggression and Russian
response was relatively successful in dominating early
discourse on the war. But there were elements of the
Russian narrative that were heavy-handed and poorly
considered. The most obvious of these is the claim of
Georgian genocide against South Ossetia, which Russian and South Ossetian sources claimed had resulted
in 1,400-2,000 civilian casualties. Although this figure
was often repeated by Western media in the early days
of the war, it was later rejected by multiple independent investigations, which put the number of South
Ossetian civilian casualties in the 100-133 range and
acknowledged that a number of these were probably
South Ossetian fighters in civilian clothes.80
There was a backlash from the extreme nature of
some Russian claims about the war and the heavyhanded way in which they were delivered. Ordinary
Russians who wanted a break from the distorted and
one-sided accounts of the situation in Georgia provided by Russian television began to turn to the internet, where a lively, two-sided and uncensored debate
ensued.81 Even experts at Moscow State University
found themselves unable to get reliable information
on the war from Russian sources and began turning
to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty for updates.82 In
summary, then, although the Russian narrative dominated the discourse in the early days of the war and although the Russian government and military proved
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more adept at handling the media than in previous
conflicts, the Russian information operations strategy
was limited in its effectiveness due to a lack of subtlety
and believability in key parts of its message.
RUSSIAN LESSONS LEARNED IN THE WAR
WITH GEORGIA
Despite the fact that the war with Georgia resulted
in a victory for Russia, the performance of the Russian military in the war has been the subject of significant discussion and criticism in the almost 2 years
since the war ended. President Dmitri Medvedev
himself named five areas of reform that must be emphasized going forward: bringing all combat formations to permanent-readiness status (i.e., elimination
of cadre units); raising the effectiveness of command
and control systems; improving the system of officer
training; upgrading equipment with a focus on PGMs;
and improving pay, housing, and social amenities for
kontraktniky and officers.83 Approaching the problem
from a different level, Lieutenant General Vladimir
Shamanov, former Chief of the Main Combat Training
and Service Directorate, identified the key problems
exposed by the war as poor interoperability between
the air force and ground forces, poor communications
capabilities, and the low resolution of Russian reconnaissance systems, especially UAVs.84
As Mikhail Barabanov, editor and co-author of
Tanks of August, noted,
Though from the position of unsophisticated extraneous observers one saw a quick, massive and decisive
action of the Russian army and successful crushing
of the Georgian armed forces, in reality, as became
completely clear, the experience of the utilization of
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the Russian armed forces in conflict was considered
sufficiently contradictory by the political-military
leadership of the RF, which led in the end to a new
stage of radical military reform, the one which has as
its goal bringing the armed forces of the country to a
“new look,” oriented, first of all, towards participation
in local conflicts in the territory of the former USSR.85

An adviser to the Minister of Defense of Russia
told Dr. Cohen that the war confirmed that Russia
needs to spend most of its efforts and procurement
funds on building a smaller, more maneuverable, and
rapidly deployable army to defend its borders, not
fight a world war. “This is where the money goes, despite losing over 50 percent of the budget to graft.”86
Finally, Russian military analysts have concluded that
although the war validated the concept of joint operations, it also demonstrated that the Russian armed
forces have a long way to go before they are capable
of operating in a truly joint manner. Readiness was a
major issue as well—a survey of the Russian military
completed after the war showed that only 17 percent
of army units and 5 out of 150 air force regiments
were combat-ready.87 Thus, the requirements for reform dictated by Russian performance in the war with
Georgia are ample and fundamental, and seem to be
acknowledged by both the political and military leadership of the country.
Equipment.
All services in the Russian armed forces experienced considerable problems with equipment during
the war. For the ground forces, the reliability of their
armored vehicles seemed to be the most troubling issue related to equipment. But survivability was also
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an issue, in part due to lack of reactive armor, but also
due simply to the low quality of Russian-made armored vehicles, which proved much more vulnerable
than their Western counterparts to aircraft, artillery,
other armored vehicles, and shoulder-fired anti-armor
weapons. Finally, the lack of night vision capability
proved another significant problem.
For the air force, the lack of an effective and reliable
anti-radar missile proved fatal for Russia’s ability to
conduct effective SEAD. A lack of reliable, all-weather
PGMs was also a significant equipment-related weakness, as was the lack of equipment designed to allow
Russian aircraft to operate at night. Finally, the Russian ability to conduct close air support was eroded
by the lack of radios interoperable with those in the
Russian ground forces.
Although the Russian navy was not tested in the
war with Georgia, Russian analysts and military leaders have remarked that the landing on the coast of
Abkhazia, which proved difficult even though unopposed, highlighted the need for improvements in the
area of amphibious landing platforms. The limitations
in this capability exposed by the war were certainly
part of the reason for Russia’s recent decision to buy
Mistral-class ships from France. The Mistral, a multirole ship capable of transporting and deploying 16
helicopters, 70 armored vehicles, and up to 450 personnel, represents a significant improvement over
current Russian helicopter carriers and landing craft.
However, internal bickering over budgets and rampant corruption may still derail the shift to acquisition of foreign surface combatants, which made up the
bulk of the czarist navy prior to World War I.
One of the areas in which Russian deficiencies were
most starkly demonstrated was that of command,
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control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), which has
been bluntly described as unsatisfactory by military
analysts.88 The aforementioned lack of interoperability
between the radio systems of different services and the
vulnerability of Russian radios to electronic warfare
led Russian commanders to rely on mobile phones for
a considerable portion of their command and control
requirements during the war. Although this in itself is
bad enough, the fact that these calls went over Georgian mobile phone networks, which are the primary
networks serving South Ossetia,89 makes the problem
even more significant from a communications security
standpoint.
The criticality of satellite imagery, navigation, and
guidance was also amply demonstrated during the
war. The fact that GLONASS was not fielded and that
GPS data were disrupted—presumably at the request
of the United States—led to massive problems in selecting targets for the air campaign and in delivering
precision strikes on Georgian targets. It may also have
adversely affected the Russian SEAD effort; Roger
McDermott attributes the Russian failure to make use
of anti-radar missiles to the lack of GLONASS or GPS
guidance.90 The lack of a satellite navigation capability
also presumably led to operational security breaches
as units used radios or—more likely—mobile phones
to report their positions to their higher headquarters,
rather than higher headquarters simply following the
positions of all of its units on a digital map. These
shortcomings help explain why in September 2008
Russian Prime Minister Putin announced an increase
in funding for GLONASS by 67 billion rubles (approximately $2.4 billion).91
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Doctrine, Training, and Personnel.
As President Medvedev’s five areas of emphasis
noted above make clear, the experience of the war
showed that doctrine, training, and personnel make
up a considerable portion of the systems in need of
reform. In this realm, special focus has been put on
the following areas: transition to a contract (professional) force; reorganization of the ground forces from
the old military district and division-based system to
a brigade-based system; elimination of cadre units;
improvements in officer training; and improvements
in social and living conditions, especially for junior
service members. The catalysts for all of these changes
can be found in the experience of the war with Georgia.
Although the transition to a contract force has encountered some resistance from senior Russian military officers, the fact that Russia was forced to send
conscripts into combat in violation of official policy
and the fact that many of these conscripts performed
poorly, led the Russian leadership to see expanding
the percentage of contract soldiers in the armed forces
as a necessity. Moreover, the Russian military district
and division-based structure proved inflexible in responding to the requirements of a short, mid-intensity
war along Russia’s border. The 76th Air Assault Division, for example, needed to be split into two task-organized units, with one sent to South Ossetia and the
other to Abkhazia. The Russian reform effort—much
like that of its U.S. predecessor—envisions permanent
task-organized brigade-sized units with all enablers
assigned, providing significantly greater flexibility.
The drive to eliminate cadre units, the next area
of emphasis, stems directly from the fact that during
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the war the leadership of these units proved generally
unsatisfactory, due to lack of experience in commanding actual troops and the fact that the requirements to
staff cadre units led to a depletion of personnel from
first-line units. The fourth area of emphasis—the poor
tactical performance of many Russian units—amply
demonstrated the need to improve the system of officer training. And finally, improving social and living standards has long been an imperative within the
Russian military, but little has been done about it.
However, once Russian soldiers saw the living conditions of Georgian soldiers in bases like Senaki and
Gori, they became livid at their own squalid conditions—as a much-circulated mobile phone video of
the expletive-laden tirade of several Russian soldiers
inside the Georgian barracks at Senaki makes clear.
Cyber Warfare and Information Warfare.
Since the war with Georgia marked the first use of
cyber warfare and information operations in conjunction with a conventional military operation, this area
proved fertile ground for Russian lessons learned. In
the area of cyber warfare, Russian denial-of-services
attacks on Georgian websites were effective early in
preventing the Georgian government from getting its
message out, and the fact that these attacks were likely
orchestrated by the Russian Business Network gave
the Russian government a veneer of deniability. However, the pressure that these attacks put on the Georgian government resulted in two adverse consequences apparently unforeseen by Russian planners—first,
the rise of the Georgian blogosphere, which proved
difficult if not impossible to attack due to its diffuse
nature and lack of a central node of control; and sec-
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ond, the increased use of television—especially Western television channels—by the Georgian government
to get its message out. On television, Georgia’s young,
Western-educated political leadership generally
made a better impression on Western audiences than
did their Russian counterparts, even though Russian
spokesmen and diplomats have made considerable
strides in this area.
The information war contained three main lessons for Russian political and military leaders. First
is the need to verify accusations made against the enemy or to moderate them if verification is impossible.
An example of this is Russian claims of a Georgianperpetrated “genocide” in Tskhinvali. The original
accusations came from South Ossetian officials, but
their Russian counterparts echoed them immediately, thereby lending them more credence than they
would otherwise have had. When these claims were
later definitely disproven—and in fact it was proven
by multiple independent investigations that Georgian
villages in South Ossetia suffered significantly greater
damage and that their residents were systematically
driven out—Russian claims of genocide by Georgia
began to look hypocritical, to say the least.
The next lesson learned in the information war is
that embedded reporters are a double-edged sword.
While they can be effective at putting a human face on
the Russian military effort and in telling the Russian
side of the story, they can also undermine the information strategy. First, the fact that the Russian government flew some 50 embedded reporters to Tskhinvali
days before the outbreak of the war, where they were
seen by a photographer for Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty when he arrived on August 5 for a previously
scheduled photo shoot,92 casts doubt upon the Russian
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narrative that Russian peacekeepers and South Ossetian civilians were the innocent and unsuspecting victims of Georgian aggression on August 8. Embedded
reporters can also serve as conduits for the release of
information on the locations and activities of the units
they are embedded with. Aside from being an obvious
security risk (think of Geraldo Rivera drawing with
his stick in the sand of the Iraqi desert), it can be especially damaging if this information contradicts the
official narrative of events, as was the case with the
multiple reports in the Russian-language press of Russian units entering South Ossetia prior to the outbreak
of the war.
The final lesson learned in the information war is
the ubiquity of cameras of all types on the battlefield.
Soldiers, journalists, and civilians carrying mobile
phones—almost all of which now have relatively capable video camera apps—are a constant and omnipresent potential source of unfiltered content straight
from the battlefield to the internet. Three vignettes
serve to illustrate the effects of this phenomenon. The
first is the mobile phone video with the audible sound
of Russian soldiers going through the Georgian barracks in Senaki, and their obvious surprise and anger
in finding that the army they have just beaten lives
better than they do in every conceivable category. The
second is the mobile phone video of Georgian soldiers
in their armored vehicles moving through Tskhinvali
on the morning of August 8. The fact that the town
was deserted, but intact—with smoke visible from
only one building—cast early doubt on the Russian
claims that Georgia had subjected it to massive and indiscriminate artillery bombardment the night before.
Finally, there is the video taken by a journalist of
Russian 58th Army Commander Khruliev pounding
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the ground with his fist and lamenting the loss of virtually his entire command group after it rolled into an
ambush by Georgian forces. Western military forces
have extensive experience with the issues of message
management, embedded reporters, and ubiquitous
cameras on the battlefield, and still struggle with
them; it is therefore unlikely that Russia, with much
less experience, will remain immune from the effects
of embedded reporting in future conflicts.
MILITARY MODERNIZATION 2 YEARS LATER
Despite the inevitable resistance to radical change
from some quarters of the Russian military and the effects of bureaucratic inertia on Russian reform plans,
a fair amount has been accomplished in the almost
2 years since the end of the war between Russia and
Georgia. Reform efforts began with personnel and
force structure changes and are only now beginning to
move in the direction of modernizing equipment and
reforming procurement procedures. Russian observers have noted that the reforms of the Russian forces
in the North Caucasus Military district caused the following outcomes:
•	Decrease in number of tank and mechanized
infantry battalions;
•	Disorganization of the old cadre system;
•	Decrease in number of attack aircraft near Georgian borders with some expansion of possibilities for immediate troop [aerial] support, due
to the creation of front and army aviation air
bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and beginning of rearmament of army aviation with
new helicopters; and,
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•	Decrease in opportunities to beef up the military group in the Caucasus quickly with the
help of other military districts and air assault
troops, due to a decrease in the number of military cargo planes.
At the same time, the process of rearmament of
North Caucasus units with new and more modern
systems is supposed to compensate for the decrease
in their numbers. Moreover, the strengthening of warfighting capabilities of the Russian troops based in
Armenia will allow them to be used for an attack on
Tbilisi-Marneuli from the south, and/or [for an attack]
against Javakheti and further against Adjara.93
Despite substantial budget increases, the impact of
corruption on the reform process makes its successful
completion an unsure and expensive prospect.
Personnel and Force Structure.
Initial Russian military reform efforts focused on
personnel and force structure changes. Given the cuts
in the officer corps envisioned, it is no surprise that
these efforts met with resistance from elements of the
Russian military leadership. Initial resistance emanated primarily from retired generals and officers, the
General Staff ,and military educational institutions, the
number of which was slated to be cut from 65 to 10.94
Additionally, reform plans called for the discharge
of some 200,000 officers and 120,000 warrant officers,
and a reduction in the overall number of Army units
from 1,890 to 172.95 Despite resentment from within
the ranks of the military and delays due to the need
to provide housing for discharged service members,
these reforms have largely been completed. Current
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areas of emphasis are the introduction of a new salary
scale and the development of a professional noncommissioned officer corps.
The new Russian military is being reduced in
strength from 1.3 million men to 1.0 million and will
use the brigade as its principal combat formation, having eliminated the regimental and divisional levels
of command. This new military structure is thought
to be more useful in the regional and local types of
conflicts Russia envisions itself fighting over the short
and mid term. Minister of Defense Anatoly Serdiukov
remarked in December 2008 that the objective of the
reforms is to allow Russia to prosecute three of these
types of conflicts simultaneously.96 Russian troops
will also form the core of the 5,000-man rapid reaction force of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO, the security arm of the CIS), which Russia
hopes to turn into a rival to NATO by establishing it as
the preeminent security pact in the post-Soviet space.
Procurement and Budgeting.
Having completed the bulk of the personnel and
force structure reforms, Russia is now shifting focus
to equipment modernization. As noted earlier, among
the unpleasant surprises for Russian troops and leaders in the war with Georgia was the fact that Georgian
equipment was often better than that of the Russians
themselves. The recent promotion of Colonel-General
(Retired) Vladimir Popovkin to the post of First Deputy
Defense Minister portends a shift in focus from equipping the force to reorganizing it, and also a greater
Russian willingness to purchase military equipment
from foreign firms. Popovkin had been Chief of the
Armaments Directorate of the Russian Ministry of
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Defense; his promotion signals not so much a shift in
his responsibilities as an elevation of the procurement
portfolio within the Ministry of Defense. Indeed, in
announcing his promotion to First Deputy Minister,
President Medvedev instructed him to “coordinate rearmament and procurement, and put into practice the
new state armament program that is being finalized
at present.”97 Medvedev also directed him to crack
down on defense contractors that “make mischief” by
inflating prices,98 an acknowledgment that even with
rising defense budgets, Russia must get more bang
for its procurement buck if it hopes to modernize and
avoid falling farther behind the West in the quality of
its armaments.
Earlier, Medvedev had announced the new weapons systems and platforms that will enter service with
the Russian armed forces in 2009-10; these include
five Iskander-M ballistic missile systems with 300
ballistic missiles, 300 tanks and armored vehicles, 30
helicopters, 28 combat aircraft, 3 nuclear submarines,
one corvette, and 11 satellites. While the numbers
might be impressive, they fail to convey the fact that
this new equipment will still be based on late-Soviet
designs that have been around for at least the last 1015 years.99 For the Russian military to truly transform
into a 21st century force, it must procure 21st century
equipment (and train soldiers to use it), but—except in
rare cases—the Russian defense industry is incapable
of producing equipment of this caliber.
The second reason for the importance of Popovkin’s
promotion is that it signals that the recent Russian
willingness to purchase key capabilities from foreign
firms has support at the highest levels of the Russian
government. Popovkin was among the first of senior
Russian officials to advocate purchasing military
equipment abroad. In January 2008—even before the
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war with Georgia—Popovkin became the first Russian
military official to disclose publicly that Russia was
using foreign electronic components in its military
satellites, and in July of that year, he announced that
the French firm Thales had been awarded a contract to
provide Russian T90S tanks with night vision infrared
television cameras.100 The war with Georgia convinced
much of Russia’s leadership that Popovkin’s instincts
were correct—that there were certain capabilities that
were so important to the creation of a technologically
advanced military force that they must be purchased
from the best available source, regardless of country
of origin.
Many Russian military and political leaders agreed
with Popovkin’s assessment that the Russian defense
industry would not be spurred to develop better systems unless it were subjected to competition from foreign firms. In September 2009, Popovkin announced
to representatives of Russian defense firms that the
Ministry of Defense would purchase equipment
abroad if they could not provide it. Later that month
the Ministry signed a contract with an Israeli firm for
the purchase of UAVs.101 Given the abysmal performance of the Russian-made Pchela UAV in the war
with Georgia—Russian commanders said the images
it sent were so poor, they were useless and it “flew so
low you could hit it with a slingshot and [it] roared
like a BTR”102—it is unsurprising that Russia chose to
seek a foreign vendor for this key platform. In September 2010, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak and his
Russian counterpart, Anatoly Serdyukov, signed the
first military cooperation agreement between Russia
and Israel. Under the agreement, Israel will provide
Russia the UAV and other technology.103 This decision
represents a shift from the long-standing Soviet and
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Russian practice to source virtually all military equipment from domestic producers.
All indications are that purchases of equipment
from foreign sources will accelerate. In addition to the
UAV purchase from Israel, which could total $300400 million and which Russia hopes will lead to an
agreement to produce UAVs under license on Russian soil,104 there is the previously mentioned tender
to supply an amphibious landing/helicopter carrier
ship, which Mistral-class ships from France are likely to win. Russia is also attempting to turn this deal
into a licensed-production agreement, allowing it to
produce some or all parts of the ships domestically
after an initial purchase of one or two French-made
Mistrals.105 Finally, Popovkin recently announced that
Russia is negotiating to buy German armor for Russian combat vehicles and technical support to produce
it domestically.106
A more professional, more mobile, and better
equipped force means a more expensive force. Accordingly, the Russian military budget has climbed
precipitously in recent years, rising by 27 percent to
$50 billion from 2008 to 2009 alone, marking a 10-fold
increase in defense spending since 2000.107 But even
with these gaudy rates of increase, Russia is still attempting to maintain a force only 20 percent smaller
than that of the U.S. military on a budget 1/15th the
size of the U.S. defense budget.108 Even with the shift
toward equipping the force with modern systems,
procurement accounts for only 30 percent of the Russian defense budget, compared to 54 percent in the
United States.109
To make matters worse, the impact of corruption
on the Russian defense budget is enormous—retired
General Alexander Kanshin says up to 30 percent of
the budget is stolen or misused,110 and other Russian
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military officials have in confidence asserted that the
figure might be even higher.111 Given these conditions—a rising but still small budget for the size of the
force, a smaller percentage of that budget devoted to
procurement than in the United States, and the corrosive impact of corruption—it is highly uncertain
whether Russia’s drive for modernization of its military equipment will be successful, lessons of the Georgian war notwithstanding.
CHANGES IN RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE
The recently released 2010 Russian military doctrine represents an attempt to integrate lessons from
the war with Georgia—both political and military—
and use them where they advance Russia’s conception
of itself as a power once again on the rise. However,
where the lessons of the Georgia war come into conflict with entrenched organizational interests within
the Russian military, Russia’s doctrine writers proved
less willing to integrate these lessons into the document. In the end, given Russia’s limited resources and
expanding ambitions, there are four key balances that
the new doctrine must strike: between preparing for
internal and regional conflicts and preparing for conflicts with other great powers; between training for
counterinsurgency and training for conventional military operations; between a legacy 20th century force
and a 21st century force; and between a professional
and a conscript force.
Internal and Regional Versus Major Conflicts.
The balance between preparing for internal and
regional conflicts versus preparing for larger conflicts
is an area in which Russia’s Great Power ambitions
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and its nostalgia for its Cold War sense of superpower
status clash with its current threats and geopolitical
situation. An increasingly violent North Caucasus,
instability in Central Asia, and the rise of China all
point to a need for Russia to configure itself to fight
small- to mid-sized wars along its borders. However,
the new doctrine cannot quite rid itself of the idea
that the primary danger to Russia comes from NATO.
While NATO has been downgraded from a “threat”
to a “military danger,” which the doctrine defines as
a situation that can under certain circumstances develop into a threat, NATO’s capacity to act globally
and its enlargement still warrant special mention.112
Other dangers listed are the deployment of foreign
forces on territory adjacent to Russia and its allies, the
development of missile defense systems on proximate
foreign soil, and the creation of strategic nonnuclear
weapons113—all clear references to U.S. or Western activities or programs. China merits no mention in the
doctrine.114
The new doctrine also continues to promote a
long-standing Russian goal—the (re-) establishment
of spheres of influence in the former Soviet area. Indeed, Medvedev himself foreshadowed this when on
August 31, 2008, he gave a television address asserting that Russia has a “zone of privileged interests”
along its periphery where it would operate in defense
of its interests without submitting its actions to international institutions for discussion or approval. The
new doctrine echoes this theme by advocating a “division of zones of responsibility between NATO and the
CSTO and expanding the Russian President’s authority to deploy forces abroad without prior consultation
with parliament.115
Interestingly, when presented with what would
seem to have been a golden opportunity to assert
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these newly minted privileges, after the interim Kyrgyz government requested Russia to deploy forces
to quell ethnic violence in the Fergana Valley in June
2010, Russia not only declined to do so unilaterally
but failed to press the CSTO to do so. This may indicate that Russian military interventions in the Near
Abroad are as much directed at the West as they are at
the country in which the intervention takes place. In
Kyrgyzstan, despite the presence of a U.S. air base, the
United States made it clear from the outset that it had
no plans to deploy peacekeeping or stability forces,
and Kyrgyzstan’s geographic, economic, and security
situations keep it dependent upon Russia to a considerable extent. Russia may therefore have concluded it
had nothing to gain by deploying forces to Kyrgyzstan and nothing to lose by failing to do so.
Contrasted with this recent restraint in its selfproclaimed “zone of privileged interests” is Russia’s
behavior further afield. Russia has been busy establishing new anchorages and naval bases far from
the waters of the Russian Federation. It has recently
deployed naval forces to Tartus/Latakiye (Syria),
Venezuela, and Cuba and has discussed establishing
a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean and Red
Sea, where it currently participates in the anti-piracy
operation. Russian aircraft have also expanded air
patrols on both the Atlantic and Pacific, at times harassing foreign ships and aircraft or probing foreign
airspace.116
Thus, although the new Russian military doctrine
explicitly lists NATO enlargement, not the West as
a whole, as a danger, both the doctrine and Russian
behavior seem to confirm that, in striking a balance
between preparing to fight internal and small regional
wars and preparing to confront the West, Russia’s
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military imperatives and its political desires are at
odds. While Russian military and political leaders
certainly understand that the violent North Caucasus,
an unstable Central Asia, and a rising China argue for
the development of forces capable of fighting local
and regional wars (and these forces are in fact being
developed), Russia’s old Cold Warriors cannot quite
rid themselves of the notion that the West is a dangerous potential enemy that bears watching and that
its overtures to Russia’s neighbors constitute infringements on Russia’s alleged special privileges in these
countries.
Counterinsurgency Versus Conventional Military
Operations.
While the first balance the new doctrine attempts to
strike is between the types of threats Russia faces, the
second one is between the types of forces it requires to
meet those threats. If Russia’s military situation and its
geopolitical ambitions are in tension in the first case,
in this case its military requirements and its procurement system appear to sometimes be working at cross
purposes. Given that the primary near- and mid-term
threats to Russian security come from internal insurgency in the North Caucasus and regional instability
in the former Soviet Union, one would expect the new
doctrine to emphasize the development of highly capable counterinsurgency forces and mobile forces capable of conducting limited but fast-paced joint and
highly lethal operations along Russia’s periphery.
Indeed, a senior Russian military official remarked
recently that what Russia is attempting to develop is
a “small, professional army for Russia’s periphery.”117
The new doctrine echoes this by providing for the use
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of Russian forces abroad to “protect the interests of
the Russian Federation and its citizens.”118
But a review of Russia’s recent procurement priorities does not necessarily support this objective. Recall
that prominent among Russia’s deliveries in 2009-10
were ballistic missiles, tanks, nuclear submarines, and
surface ships. In addition, the new doctrine and recent
Russian military budgets continue to devote considerable resources to Russia’s strategic nuclear forces. All
of these legacy systems compete for scarce resources
with the forces and capabilities Russia needs for the
army it claims to be building. There is an argument to
be made that the procurement timeline is so long that
these items were already in the pipeline long before
Russia’s new doctrine was published. While this may
be the case, the same cannot be said of Russia’s foreign procurements. Some of these—UAVs, upgraded
armor, and night vision devices—are clearly designed
to assist in developing smaller, more mobile, and
more lethal forces for counterinsurgency and regional
conflicts, but others—the Mistral-class ships, by far the
most expensive of the foreign purchases—seem designed to give Russia a conventional power projection
capability of dubious use in fighting insurgents and
local wars along its periphery.
20th Century Versus 21st Century Warfare.
Military analysts like Margarete Klein and Roger
McDermott have correctly noted that the Russia-Georgia War was the last “20th century” war Russia is likely to fight. Russian leaders seemed to understand this,
and they therefore embarked on the effort currently
underway to shed cumbersome 20th-century military
formations like the military district and the division, to
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reform military staffs and the educational system with
the goal of streamlining decisionmaking and encouraging leaders to take initiative, and to procure modern, 21st-century military equipment. Despite this, the
new doctrine completely fails to mention these reform
processes. As Keir Giles says, “It is impossible to overstate the magnitude of the upheaval, and of the shift
in operational assumptions, that have shaken the Russian military over the last 13 months; nevertheless the
new doctrine reflects the status quo ante.”119
In some areas the new doctrine does backhandedly
acknowledge that there have been changes, but it neither clarifies nor endorses them. For instance, while
the new doctrine deletes the portion of the 2000 doctrine that clarified the role of the Ministry of Defense,
the General Staff, and the military districts, it does not
replace it.120 In other words, the new document is simply mute on the issue of who does what at the highest
levels of the Russian military. It is possible that the
long-bureaucratized process of doctrine writing failed
to keep up with the pace of reform, and that the pressure to release the new military doctrine resulted in
a decision to release it “as is” rather than attempt to
secure approval from all stakeholders for comprehensive changes at the 11th hour.
It is also possible that the failure to detail the comprehensive reform processes underway are an attempt to undermine them. In this view, the authors of
the new doctrine, opponents of the reforms like many
high-ranking officers in the Russian military, decided
that withholding any mention of the reforms in a published military doctrine might make them simpler to
reverse when the time is right. In any case, it is curious
that the most comprehensive military reforms undertaken in the Russian military in generations, reforms
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designed to turn the Russian armed forces into a 21stcentury fighting force, drew no mention whatsoever
in the first 21st-century Russian military doctrine.
Professional Versus Conscript Force.
This area is another one in which the objectives of
Russian political leaders have met resistance from its
military bureaucracy. As mentioned previously, in
the war with Georgia the Russian military was forced
to violate its own policy by deploying conscripts to a
military operation on foreign soil. In addition, even
Russian kontraktniky often proved poorly trained and
incapable of the type of fast-paced, independent operations required in this war, forcing the better trained
airborne and special forces units to do much of the
fighting.121 Paul Rich maintains that even as raw material the kontraktniky proved less than optimal—many
of them turned out to be in poor health and/or barely
educated, since they came primarily from rural and
economically disadvantaged backgrounds.122
Perhaps reflecting these shortcomings, the new
doctrine is less ambitious in its vision for the replacement of conscripts with kontraktniky. Whereas the
previous objective had been a fully professionalized
Russian military, the new doctrine simply states that
formations and military units should “in the majority”
be manned by professional soldiers.123 Some Western
military analysts have opined that the current consensus within the Russian military is that the experiment with professionalization of the armed forces has
failed and that Russia will return to a largely conscript
force.124 Whatever the source of the newfound unease
among some in the Russian military with transition to
a fully professional force, what is clear is that Russia’s
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stated intention to transform its military to enable it to
meet 21st-century challenges is at odds with the maintenance of conscription. By most accounts, distortions
and corruption in Russia’s conscription system mean
that the quality of conscripts entering the Russian
armed forces will remain generally worse than the
quality of Russian kontraktniki.
In summary, then, the new Russian military doctrine attempts to square the lessons of the Georgia
war with traditional Russian geopolitical objectives
and entrenched organizational interests within the
Russian military. Given the impossibility of doing so
completely, the document that emerges from the effort is often pragmatic, although at times far-fetched
and even self-contradictory. It is worthwhile for U.S.
policymakers to study the reasons for, and conduct of,
the war, as well as the resulting changes in the military doctrine, procurement, and geopolitical behavior
connected to the Russo-Georgian hostilities.
The long-term outcomes of the current RussiaGeorgia war will be felt far and wide, from Afghanistan to Iran and from the Caspian to the Mediterranean. The war was an earthquake, indicating that the
geopolitical tectonic plates are shifting, and nations
in Eurasia, as well as U.S. policymakers, need to take
notice.
GEOPOLITICAL LESSONS FROM THE WAR
Lessons from the Russia-Georgia war abound, and
apply both to grand strategy, military operations, cyber warfare, and strategic information operations. The
most important of these are:
•	Russian continental power is on the rise. In 2008
Russia was willing, and may be willing again
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in the future, to change the borders of Europe
by force, making the 1975 Helsinki Accords
obsolete. Moscow justifies this policy by citing
Kosovo and other Yugoslav examples. The war
is intricately linked with Russia’s demands to
revise European security architecture, do away
with NATO, and weaken the U.S. security presence in, and ties with, Europe. The 20-year-long
post-Cold War era of joint attempts between
NATO and Russia to build a joint European security architecture has come to an end.125
•	The war undermined the close relationships the
United States had developed with post-Soviet
states since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Small states treat nuclear- and conventionallyarmed great powers with respect. In addition,
the historic memory of the past imperial domination plays a role in the attitudes of peripheral
elites towards the former metropolis’ geopolitical agendas: the former imperial master is often nine feet tall. Provoking a militarily strong
great power, such as Russia, China, or Iran, is
clearly dangerous. Saakashvili’s is an example
that many leaders in the post-Soviet space are
understandably reluctant to follow, remembering it in their dealings with Moscow.
•	Expressions of U.S. support are an insufficient
deterrent short of NATO membership or a separate mutual defense pact. U.S. expressions of
support provided to Georgia (clearly, short of
an explicit mutual defense pact) may or may
not result in military assistance if/when a postSoviet state is under attack, especially when
the attacker has an effective deterrent, such as
nuclear arms deliverable against U.S. targets.
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•	U.S. intelligence and military assistance shortcomings are obvious. U.S. intelligence-gathering and analysis regarding the Russian threat
to Georgia failed. The U.S. military assistance
to Georgia, worth around $2 billion over the
last 15 years and focused on the development
of counterinsurgency capabilities instead of
conventional warfare, did not prevent the August 2008 debacle. No scenarios of a Russian
invasion were envisaged, wargamed, or seriously exercised. No force structure to resist a
Russian invasion was built by the Georgian
authorities with U.S. support. U.S. intelligence
managers justified the failure by complaining
that the satellite capabilities were redeployed
for Iraq.126 Other intelligence sources told the
principal author that ample warning was provided to the George W. Bush administration.127
Additionally, the war demonstrates that there
is no substitute for high-quality human intelligence and raises questions with regards to the
reporting chain to the National Security Command Authority.
•	Air power is not sufficient. Russia used air,
armor, the Black Sea Fleet, Special Forces, and
allied militias in the attack. Clausewitzian lessons still apply to the August 2008 war: the use
of overwhelming force against the enemy’s
center of gravity by implementing a combined
air-land-sea operation may be 20th-century
style, but it does work.128
•	Surprise and speed of operations matter, as
they have for the 4,000 years of recorded history of warfare. To be successful, wars must have
limited and achievable goals. Russia achieved
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most of its goals between Friday and Monday,
while the world, including President Bush, was
watching the Olympics and parliaments were
on vacation.
•	Russia is prepared to take military casualties—
within reason—and inflict overwhelming military and civilian casualties at a level unacceptable to the enemy. Georgia lost some 100-200
soldiers and effectively capitulated. A tougher
enemy could well suffer a proportionally higher rate of casualties and keep on fighting.
•	Information and psychological warfare is important. So is cyber security. It looks like during the war, the Russians conducted repeated
denial-of-service attacks against Georgia (and
in 2007, against Estonia), shutting down key
websites. Russia was ready with accusations
and footage of alleged Georgian atrocities in
South Ossetia, shifting the information operation playing field to describing Georgia as an
aggressor; portraying itself and its Ossetian allies as victims; saving Ossetian civilians from
barbaric Georgians. These operations matter
domestically, to shore up support and boost
morale at home and to isolate the adversary
and undermine his reputation internationally.
•	International organizations failed to prevent
the war and force Russia to observe the ceasefire conditions. This was because (1) Russia was
classified as a “peacekeeper”—through a CISbased mechanism before the war, in addition
to effectively being a side in the conflict; and (2)
Moscow enjoyed a veto power in two organizations that could play a peacekeeping role in
Georgia: OSCE and the UN. Russia would not
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agree to a NATO peacekeeping force, while the
EU expressed no sufficient interest in deploying a credible contingent in the Caucasus.
The Russia-Georgia war indicates that the balance
of power in western Eurasia has shifted, and that U.S.
power may be deteriorating in the face of its lengthy
and open-ended commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Libya, and the Global War on Terror, which are leading to global overstretch. While the Middle East, and
especially the Persian Gulf, will remain a top priority
in U.S. foreign policy, Russia is playing an increasingly active role in the strategic environment along its
southern tier, from the Black Sea to Afghanistan and
western China.
THE RUSSIA-GEORGIA WAR AFTERMATH: REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The war demonstrated fissures in Europe between
the Western powers eager to maintain good relations
with Russia and the Eastern European states that, 20
years after the collapse of the USSR, retain a political
memory of the Soviet occupation. Specifically, Germany, France, and Italy were anxious to put the war
behind them and treated it as a nuisance, whereas the
presidents of Poland, Ukraine, Estonia, and Lithuania
and the Prime Minister of Latvia flew to Tbilisi during
the war to stand shoulder to shoulder with Saakashvili.
The war also demonstrated weaknesses of NATO
and the EU security system, since they provided no
effective response to Russia’s forcibly changing the
borders and to the occupation of of an OSCE member
state.
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Washington Sending Mixed Signals.
Vice President Joe Biden’s trip to Ukraine and
Georgia in the summer of 2009 failed to assuage fears
that America may be abandoning its allies in the postSoviet space. Instead, fudged messages and more confusion prevailed. The mere fact that the Vice President
ventures into what Russia calls its “near abroad” 2
weeks after President Barack Obama’s visit to Moscow raised concerns that the White House has downgraded its relationship with Ukraine and Georgia.
“Just as all states should have the right to choose
their leaders, states must have the right to borders
that are secure, and to their own foreign policies.
That is true for Russia, just as it is true for the United
States. . . . That’s why we must apply this principle
to all nations—and that includes nations like Georgia
and Ukraine,” declared President Obama in his June
7 Moscow speech. Yet, after Biden’s visit, questions
about Georgia’s security remained unanswered.
The Obama administration believes that prioritizing the relationship with Moscow may address real
needs in such vital areas as Afghanistan, Iran, and
arms control. But while the global agenda is important, so is U.S credibility in Eurasia and among European allies.
Biden’s trip to Georgia raised concerns, despite a
hero’s welcome there. Hundreds of Georgians lined
the streets with slogans like, “Don’t Forget Us” and
“No to Occupation,” in reference to Russia’s presence
on Georgian territory since the summer of 2008. Vice
President Biden rebuffed Russia’s claims to a 19thcentury-style sphere of influence. He delivered a message that the United States is seeking a free, secure,
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democratic, and united Georgia. But this declaration
came with qualifications and was short on operational
details.
Importantly, the Vice President rejected any physical security guarantees to Georgia in case of a Russian attack. Here, some creative ambiguity could be
in order. Behind closed doors, Biden warned against
any future use of force to liberate the Russian-occupied territories—a position inherited from the Clinton
and Bush administrations—and rejected Georgia’s requests for defensive weapons, such as anti-tank and
anti-aircraft systems. More than a year later, this policy still prevails. The Obama administration is walking
a tightrope between trying to improve the frayed relationship with Russia while simultaneously rejecting
Moscow’s spurious claims to a “sphere of privileged
interests” in the former Soviet Union and Eastern and
Central Europe.
To boost the confidence of U.S. allies, Washington
should expand cooperation with NATO allies in formulating and implementing a joint policy that clearly
delineates security “red lines” in Europe, including
contingency planning for the defense of Eastern and
Central European NATO members. Such planning,
undertaken for the Baltic States after the Georgia war
is a welcome beginning.
The United States should continue to cooperate with, upgrade, and improve the militaries in the
post-Soviet states, especially Azerbaijan, Georgia,
and Ukraine. It should work with post-Soviet states
on developing democratic institutions, transparency,
the rule of law, and good governance, since stronger
institutions themselves enhance national security and
improve the investment climate.
And to make clear American priorities in the region, the White House could announce a visit by Pres76

ident Obama to a non-Russian state in the region. The
President could deliver a strong message of support
for their sovereignty, territorial integrity, diplomatic
and security cooperation, Euro–Atlantic integration, democratic development, and energy security.
Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the heart of the Eastern
hemisphere, cannot and should not be neglected. Nor
can they be abandoned to the geopolitical ambitions
of those with transparent anti-American agendas. The
U.S. Government should make certain that this message rings loud and clear.
IMPLICATION OF THE RUSSIA-GEORGIA
WAR FOR IRANIAN CONTINGENCIES
In view of U.S. concerns with regard to the Iranian
nuclear program, it is worth examining the repercussions of Russia’s Georgian adventure on the control
of the South Caucasus air space. We argue that Russia
emboldened Iran by securing its northern tier through
the denial of bases, airfields, electronic facilities, and
other cooperation in Georgia and Azerbaijan to the
United States, and possibly Israeli aerial operations.
Of course, growing tensions over Iran’s nuclear
program play an important role in Russia’s policy in
South Caucasus. In case of a hot conflict, Russia wants
to be able to stop the deployment of U.S. military and
allied forces in the Caucasus, including use of air bases. Russian control of South Caucasus air space from
bases in Armenia and on Georgian territory in Abkhazia and South Ossetia will effectively deny U.S. air operations there without Moscow’s consent.
At the same time, Russia is willing to strengthen
Iranian air defenses. In 2007, Russia signed an agreement to supply Iran and secured its right to sell mod-
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ern S-300 long-range anti-aircraft missiles to that
country despite the third round of UN Security Council sanctions. The example of the Bushehr nuclear
reactor, which Russia fueled in August 2010, demonstrates that Moscow fulfills prior agreements—albeit
with delays.
The S-300 system, which has a radius of over 90
miles and effective altitudes of about 90,000 feet, is
capable of tracking up to 100 targets simultaneously.
It is considered one of the best in the world and is
amazingly versatile—capable of shooting down aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missile warheads.5
The S-300 complements the Tor-M1 air defense missile
system, also supplied by Russia. In 2007, Russia delivered 29 Tor-M1s worth $70 million to Iran.
The deployment of the anti-aircraft shield in Iran, if
it occurs, effectively limits the window in which Israel
or the United States could conduct an effective aerial
campaign aimed at destroying, delaying, or crippling
the Iranian nuclear program. The Islamic Republic will
use the long-range anti-aircraft system, in addition to
the point-defense TOR M-1 short-range Russian-made
system, to protect its nuclear infrastructure, including
suspected nuclear weapons facilities, from a potential
U.S. or Israeli preventive strike.
BROADER REPERCUSSIONS OF THE WAR
Two years after the Russia-Georgia war, it is clear
that the conflict changed the balance of power in postSoviet Eurasia. Russia continues to strengthen its
dominance in the region. It was reportedly involved
in the April 2010 overthrow of Kyrgyzstan President
Kurmanbek Bakyiev. It is pressuring Belarus to jettison strongman Alexander Lukashenka. In August
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2010, Moscow tightened the screws on Georgia and
Moldova by ordering its Customs Union partners,
Kazakhstan and Belarus, to stop importing Georgian
mineral water and Moldovan (and Georgian) wines.
Critics argue that the United States jettisoned 20
years of vigorous pursuit of a bipartisan engagement
agenda in Eurasia. There was a lack of a robust U.S. response to these recent developments, stemming from
the absence of a clear vision and policy for the region.
On her recent visit to the Caucasus, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton mentioned the Russian occupation of
Georgian territory. But she emphasized “soft power”
over military challenges. Yet, Russia still speaks the
language of arms. In the last 2 years it has built five
military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In August 2010, Moscow also provided military guarantees
to Armenia, assuming a joint responsibility with Yerevan to protect Armenia’s borders against Azerbaijan
and Turkey. This development shifts the balance of
power in the region.
At the time of this writing, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has prepared for President Medvedev’s signature a draft protocol, which would not only commit
forces on Russia’s military base in Gyumri to share
security responsibilities with the Armenian army, but
also commit Russia to selling advanced weapons to the
Armenians. Baku and Ankara expressed deep concern
with these developments. According to the protocol,
the Russians will remain in Gyumri until 2044, with
an automatic 5-year lease extension. The previous
contract called for the base to be dismantled in 2015.
This arrangement is similar to that of the recently renegotiated lease for the Sevastopol naval base, which
is now extended to 2042.
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The commitment of Russian forces to defend Armenia puts Azerbaijan in an untenable situation. Its
efforts to reach out to Russia by selling gas and buying sophisticated weaponry so far has not borne fruit.
It is a clear warning that, should Baku seek to regain
the secessionist Nagorno-Karabakh as well as seven
Armenian-occupied districts of Azerbaijan, it can expect to face Moscow’s might. The subtext is clear as
well: Azerbaijan should scale back cooperation with
the West—or face the consequences.
Yet, Russia may sweeten this unsavory power pill.
The respected Vedomosti newspaper reported that the
Defense Ministry of Azerbaijan has contracted with
Rosoboronexport to purchase two battalions’ worth of
the SA-20 Gargoyle (S-300PMU-2) Favorit anti-aircraft
missile system. Russia’s Defense Ministry subsequently denied the report, but the Azeri Defense Ministry
did not.
In Eurasia, then, Moscow is using its entire toolbox
to shift the balance of power in the region in its favor.
Its tools include diplomacy (including recognition of
the self-proclaimed republics), strategic information
operations, arms sales, status-of-forces agreements,
base construction—even regime change—to secure its
sphere of privileged interests.
GEORGIA IN THE AFGHANISTAN SUPPLY
CHAIN
The United States depends on Russian influence
in Eurasia when considering the supply of the NATO
forces deployed in Afghanistan. Alternative bypasses
to the Russia-centered Northern Distribution Network
(NDN) are thus of importance to U.S. strategists and
logisticians. President Mikheil Saakashvili offered
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Georgia to become a logistical hub for NATO’s operations in Afghanistan. This offer, unveiled in an interview to the Associated Press (AP), came only days
after NATO finalized a supply-route agreement with
Kazakhstan. While a supply route through Georgia already functions (for equipment, not armaments), U.S.
officials have not immediately accepted Saakashvili’s
new proposal. Washington may prefer to cooperate
with Russia, giving it a stake in the Afghan engagement.
Saakashvili offered Georgia’s Black Sea ports of
Poti and Batumi for transshipping military supplies,
and the country’s airports for refueling cargo planes.
The AP quoted Pentagon officials as saying that the
U.S. Defense Department was aware of Saakashvili’s
offer, but had not explored the proposal. The late U.S.
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan
Ambassador Richard Holbrooke visited Georgia on
February 21-22, 2010. He planned to meet Saakashvili
and visit Georgian troops at the Krtsanisi National
Training Center and observe their training for the operation in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the issue of Georgia as a supply route for the Afghan war was on the
table.
Georgia has been utilized as a transit point for shipment of nonlethal cargos. “The route to Afghanistan is
already used extensively, because almost 80 percent of
cargo which is not going through the Pakistan route is
going through Georgia and only 20 percent through
Russia already,” said Alexander Rondeli, President of
the Georgian Foundation for Security in International
Studies (GFSIS).129
Saakashvili’s offer was not particularly remarkable, because the United States is covering all the bases by operating NDN via Russia and Kazakhstan, as
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well as its southern branch via Georgia and Azerbaijan across the Caspian Sea to Central Asia. Negotiations between the United States and the South Caucasus states for new supply routes have been underway
since March 2009. The U.S. European Command held
a conference in Baku on March 9 and 10, 2010, aimed
at exploring possible supply routes through the region. Government officials from Azerbaijan, Georgia,
and Turkey met with U.S military representatives to
discuss transit possibilities.
NATO and Kazakhstan signed an agreement on
January 27, 2010, that permits NATO allies to ship
cargo bound for Afghanistan through Kazakh territory. The agreement completed the northern supply
route, which allows overland passage of cargo from
Europe to Afghanistan.
The agreement with Kazakhstan, unlike Saakashvili’s recent proposal, allows NATO allies to ship only
nonlethal cargo through Kazakh territory by rail. It
will then pass on to Uzbekistan before reaching its final destination.
In 2009, the U.S. Defense Department said the U.S.
transportation command sent 75 percent of supplies
for the war through Pakistan. An agreement with Russia, signed in summer 2009, allows NATO flights with
troops and weapons through the Russian airspace.
The passage of some flights, however, became hampered by bureaucracy.
NATO’s second alternative to Pakistan involves
Georgia and Central Asia. Supplies coming by ship
can dock at ports in the Mediterranean (Turkey) and
the Black Sea (Russia or Georgia), and from there could
cross via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and into northern Afghanistan. Another possibility for goods arriving in Georgia or Turkey would be a route through
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Azerbaijan, across the Caspian Sea, Turkmenistan,
and then into northwest Afghanistan.
In January 2009, General David Petraeus, thencommander of the U.S. Central Command, said that
deals for supply routes to Afghanistan have been
reached with Russia and several Central Asian countries. At that time General Petraeus did not provide
any specifics.
As opposed to the Pakistani option and the northern route through Russia, the route originating in
Georgia would be the shortest. The only potential
drawback of the route is the possibility of a terrorist attack on the supply lines. The Georgian security
services are aware that such a route is a high priority
target for radical Islamists. But geopolitical concerns
might hamper U.S. officials from striking a deal with
Georgia, analysts say. “Russia is a big problem here;
no one wants to irritate that,” Rondeli said.130
Personalities of the countries’ leaders might also
be in their way. Russia would remain irritated with
Saakashvili, no matter what. Russia, being an integral
part of the Northern Distribution Route, could also be
in competition with Georgia over providing logistical
support to NATO. Russia, of course, has a stake in a
secure Afghanistan.
However, analysts agree that Georgia’s motivation
in providing supply routes for NATO armaments is
to illustrate that Tbilisi is interested not only in consuming security, but in contributing to it. The supply
route is important for the defeat of such radical Islamist movements in Afghanistan as al Qaeda and the
Taliban. Therefore, Georgia is participating together
with other countries in a joint operation to defeat the
enemies of the West.
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RUSSIAN TROOP MOVEMENTS AND
ACTIVITY IN GEORGIA: FOMENTING
POLITICAL UNREST
During the spring of 2009, the Russian Federation
significantly increased its military presence in the occupied Georgian territories of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. An intensified military buildup took place,
particularly in the territories adjacent to the separation lines in Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region. In
parallel with this buildup, there has been increased
maneuvering of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet close to the
waters around Abkhazia and regular patrolling of
Georgian airspace over Abkhazia. These latter actions
were conducted in the wake of the April 9 opposition
rallies in Georgia, adding tension to an already complicated situation.
On April 10, the Georgian Ministry of Defense accused Russia of reinforcing its military presence in
the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.131 Contemporaneously, Foreign Minister Grigol
Vashadze announced that he is “highly concerned”
about a buildup of Russian troops and heavy infantry on the two regions’ administrative borders with
Georgian-controlled territory.132
It is possible that Russia was trying to send a signal of support to the anti-Saakashvili forces. Russian
troops were reported to be gathering in the Akhalgori
region of Georgia—a mere 25 miles from Tbilisi. In an
April 8 statement to reporters, Deputy Interior Minister Eka Zghuladze said that 150 Russian armored
vehicles had been moved to Akhalgori in South Ossetia, and 35 such vehicles entered the district of Gali
in southern Abkhazia. Russian planes have been patrolling both regions since April 7 (the SU-25s over-
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flights in South Ossetia and over Abkhazia). According to a Georgian official, Russian troops are also on
high alert.133 This includes the whole 58th Army in the
North Caucasus military district.
President Saakashvili stated in an interview on
April 11 that Russia has 5,000 troops stationed in each
of the breakaway regions. Saakashvili also went on to
say that that despite the large-scale military buildup
of the Russian forces both in the breakaway regions
and on Georgia’s borders, he did not think that Russia
would “renew any large-scale military adventure.”134
Instead, he declared that these movements are aimed
at “possible internal unrests [in Georgia].”135
Large-scale protests planned by Georgian opposition leaders to unseat Saakashvili began in the spring
of 2009. The number of protestors had declined sharply
from 60,000 on its first day to roughly 2,000 by the 7th
day.136 In fact, they had taken a time-out until Tuesday for Georgian Easter. Saakashvili called for direct
dialogue with the opposition. However, though Irakli
Alasania, leader of the Alliance for Georgia coalition,
stated that he is ready for dialogue, other opposition
leaders are against it.
The so-called “radical opposition,” which includes
former Parliamentary Speaker Nino Burjanadze and
former Foreign Minister Salome Zourabishvili, has
flatly refused any offer for dialogue short of Saakashvili’s resignation.137 Saakashvili has suggested that
Russian money has figured into the protests.138 When
asked about sponsors of the opposition, Saakashvili
stated: “Most of the money—millions of dollars—
comes from Russian oligarchs. I have documentary
proof of that, which I am not making public yet.
Whether the money is being sent from Russia under
the supervision of the Russian government, that I do
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not know.”139 In addition to internal intervention, Russia is beefing up military capabilities, specifically naval assets, which make Georgia and other neighbors,
such as Baltic States, nervous.
LESSONS FROM THE WAR’S NAVAL
OPERATIONS: THE MISTRAL ASSAULT
SHIP SALE
Russian military leaders pointed out the slow pace
of naval and ship-to-shore deployments in the Georgian war and suggested a radical way to address the
drawback. As noted, Russia wants to buy the French
Mistral assault ships. In early 2010, French President
Nicolas Sarkozy approved plans to sell such a ship to
Russia. If it occurs, it would be the first major Russian warship purchased from the West since World
War I—and it may indicate a modernization breakthrough for Russian military procurement. However,
NATO, of which France is a member, does not seem
concerned. Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen announced through a spokesman that the Alliance
does not consider Russia a threat to NATO or any allied nation. Baltic nations and Georgia beg to differ.
As Russia is not yet a trusted partner to NATO, the
United States and NATO could object to such a sale,
as it imperils the security of the Alliance’s members
and aspirants. France is trying to benefit from naval
sales while ignoring concerns of NATO members and
allies, such as Georgia and the three Baltic states.
As its Soviet-era industrial base deteriorates, the
Russian leadership apparently has given up on its
indigenous naval-building capacities. Turning away
from the Soviet-era autarky, Moscow is planning to
buy sophisticated armaments, such as Mistrals or Israeli UAVs, then reverse-engineer them or produce
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them under license, to force-march its obsolescent
military through the 21st century.
In a new appropriations and acquisition policy,
and in a break from past practices when all military
systems were built at home, Moscow wants to “buy
one, build three” Mistrals under the French license.
At 23,700 tons and 210 meters long, the ship will be
smaller only than aircraft carriers. And it has leadingedge command, control, communications, and intelligence capabilities.
The ship, carrying up to two landing barges, 30 helicopters, 900 commandos, 13 tanks, and numerous armored vehicles, will be a formidable power projection
tool. Russian ship-based attack helicopters are particularly important for naval reach and punch. Vladimir
Putin has made no secret that he would deploy the
Mistral-class ships wherever he wants.
Taking history into account, Russian naval modernization should make NATO worry. Since the 18th
century, Russia has traditionally built up its smaller
sea fleets in the Baltic and the Black Sea before upgrading to the blue-water navies. Europe’s acquiescence in
the face of the Russian power projection aspirations is
both obvious and disturbing.
First, Russia snubbed President Nicolas Sarkozy
when it refused to comply with the Georgia war ceasefire agreement he signed with President Medvedev
in August 2008. Second, Russia recently conducted a
military exercise against Poland, using a 900-strong
tank attack force. NATO did not protest. Third, Russia
changed laws, allowing it to deploy troops abroad by
presidential fiat only, without any parliamentary approval. Finally, President Medvedev recently signed
a new military doctrine, which allows Russia to protect vaguely defined “compatriots” and to lower the
threshold for preemptive nuclear strikes.
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NATO, meanwhile, proceeded to build bridges
with Russia. This is understandable, since the supply
route to Afghanistan is vital—and it passes through
Russia and its allies in Central Asia. The U.S. Government was mum on announcements regarding Mistral
sales as well. Washington wanted to complete the
negotiations of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
follow-on treaty. It also expected Moscow to throw a
lifeline to the U.S.-Iran policy by supporting the sanctions on Iran at the UN Security Council in order to
entice the ayatollahs to stop their nuclear program.
Russia supported the sanctions, but Teheran did not
budge on its nuclear program’s transparency. Washington also does not want to antagonize the Elysee,
as President Obama hopes Sarkozy will send more
French troops to Afghanistan.
However, the Mistral security threat is significant.
Instead of advising Paris to postpone the sale indefinitely in view of Russia’s threatening posture toward
Georgia, the U.S. position is not to oppose the sale of
Mistral, while opposing the sales of advanced electronic and weapons system on board the ship. Plans
may change in the future, but today the Mistral sale
would be sending a wrong signal to NATO allies, to
NATO aspirants, and to the Russians.
At a time when Moscow still views NATO as an
adversary, abandons the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and occupies 20 percent of Georgian territory, a major warship sale to the Russian Navy is
premature. This is especially true when the sale is a
part of a major naval modernization, which may jeopardize NATO’s flanks and important energy routes.
NATO members should expand military cooperation with Russia only after it fulfills the August 2008
Medvedev-Sarkozy ceasefire agreement and restores
its credibility and friendship with the West.
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RUSSIAN DEPLOYMENT OF S-300 MISSILES
IN THE CAUCASUS
In August 2010, General Alexander Zelin, the
commander of the Russian air force, announced that
Moscow had deployed a state-of-the-art S-300 (SA-20
Favorit) long range air defense system in Abkhazia.
According to Zelin, the task of the air defense systems
is “to prevent violation of Abkhaz and South Ossetian
airspace and to destroy any aircraft intruding into
their airspace no matter what their purpose might
be.”140 However, there is much more than defense of
Abkhazia to the Russian deployment. Taken together
with the air force deployment and S-300 base in Armenia, that brings the strategic air space over South Caucasus and parts of the Black Sea under further Russian
control.
P. J. Crowley, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of
State and State Department spokesman, said: “I believe it’s our understanding that Russia has had S-300
missiles in Abkhazia for the past 2 years.” He later
claimed that this is “not necessarily” a new development.141 However, with this move, Russia is yet again
violating the August 2008 ceasefire agreement, negotiated by the French President Nicolas Sarkozy. It
called upon both countries to withdraw troops to prewar positions and restore the status quo ante bellum.
Instead, Russia has built at least five military bases in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the past 2 years alone.
Although the range of the system is about 120
miles, the deployment has to be seen in the context of
recent Russian policies in the Caucasus, particularly
Moscow’s recently negotiated extention of a contract
for basing troops in the Armenian Gyumri military
base till 2042. It will assume joint control over Arme-
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nian borders. As the leading member of CSTO, Russia controls air space over Armenia. Now Moscow is
reportedly considering a sale of an S-300 air defense
system to Azerbaijan.
There is a clear strategy behind these actions.
While Secretary of State Clinton hails “soft power” in
the Caucasus, Moscow engages in a hard, classic political-military power projection in this strategic region,
which connects the Atlantic (via the Black Sea and
Mediterranean) with the energy riches of Eurasia. As
President Medvedev stated in his oft-mentioned postwar 2008 speech, this is “a zone of Russian privileged
interests,” where it is willing to use force.142
Most importantly from the U.S. perspective, Russian actions are aimed at denying the United States
airspace and over-flight options. The surveillance aspect is no less important—depending on the actual
deployment of the air defenses, with the associated radars able to picture or “paint” much of western Georgia and the adjoining Black Sea coastline. The ultimate
objective for Moscow is to become an uncontested hegemon in the South Caucasus. Of course, this has potential implications in case of an Iranian contingency.
The Russians are committed to deployments in the
Caucasus that lead to the strategic denial of U.S. power projection in that region. This bears on America’s
future ability to resupply Afghanistan, use power to
disarm a nuclear Iran, ensure the energy supply from
the Caspian, and help pro-Western friends and allies.
CONCLUSION
The Russian leadership focused on Georgia as
the key element in its strategy to reassert its power
in Eurasia. For years before the 2008 invasion, Moscow sought a pretext for a war that would provide a
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payback for the NATO operation solidifying Kosovo
independence, reestablish Russian domination in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and demonstrate the consequences of NATO aspirations for a post-Soviet state.
Taken together, this was “the privileged sphere of interests” in action, 21st-century style.143
In Eurasia, Moscow is using its entire toolbox
to shift the balance of power in the region. Its tools
include diplomacy (e.g., recognition of the self-proclaimed republics), strategic information operations,
arms sales, status-of-forces agreements, and base construction—even regime change—to secure its control
over the “sphere of privileged interests.” The 2008
Georgia war was an important step toward the realization of this goal.
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